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I.

INTRODUCTION

Unions exist to provide assistance to employees; this is their reason
for being.' Yet once a union begins a campaign to represent a group of
employees, it is legally barred from extending tangible assistance to the
workers. The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or the "Board")
and courts deem a union grant of benefits to employees during or prior to a
representation campaign objectionable conduct that requires setting aside
the results of the representation election and holding another election.2
In recent years this ban has been particularly controversial with regard
to legal assistance by unions.
The NLRB, the federal agency that
administers the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), adopted the
position that unions could provide "employment-related" legal services
during representation campaigns, but two federal circuit courts overruled
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Cornell University; J.D. 1988, University of Virginia. I am grateful to David Rosenfeld for
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Catherine L. Fisk for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. I commend
Kamran Khan, Courtney Swears and Sarah Hornbeck for their excellent research assistance,
and thank the University of Baltimore School of Law for providing financial support.
1. This is demonstrated by the preamble of the constitution of the AFL-CIO, by far the
largest federation of unions in the United States. The preamble states that the AFL-CIO "is
an expression of the hopes and aspirations of the working people of America ...We
dedicate ourselves to improving the lives of working families, bringing fairness and dignity
to the workplace and securing social equity in the Nation." AFL-CIO CONST. pmbl, at
http://www.aflcio.org/about/constitution-art00.htm (last visited July 30, 2002).
2. See generally Patrick Hardin, Restrictions on Preelection Activity, I THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 367 (1992). In two cases, the Board has found that a union's
provision of monetary benefits to employees during an organizing campaign was an unfair
labor practice under Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA. See Teamsters Local 952 (Pepsi Cola
Bottling Co.), 305 N.L.R.B. 268, 275 (1991); Flatbush Manor Care Ctr., 287 N.L.R.B. 457,
457 (1987). Usually, however, union grants of benefits are challenged as objectionable
conduct in an election rather than as unfair labor practices. Id.
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the Board on this issue.' The controversy over unions providing legal
assistance to employees has drawn recent attention from scholars, who
have proposed modifying 4 or repealing5 the ban on such assistance. This
article makes a broader and more provocative proposal: to completely
abolish the prohibition on union assistance to employees during a
representation campaign.
More specifically, this article advocates allowing unions to provide
unconditional benefits, which are benefits offered to employees regardless
of whether they manifest support for the union. It is actually impossible for
either an employer or union to condition a benefit on how an employee
votes, because the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") requires that
representation elections be conducted by secret ballot.6 Unions, however,
sometimes offer benefits only to employees who sign a union authorization
card or otherwise demonstrate support for the union. These conditional
benefits in effect penalize employees who fail to manifest support for the
union, and thus interfere with an employee's right to refrain from union
support. Such interference is expressly proscribed by Sections 7 and
8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA.7
By contrast, there is no provision of the NLRA that expressly
prohibits unconditional grants of benefits, and this article contends that
there is no valid justification for that prohibition. As explained in Part III,
the ban on unions providing unconditional benefits during representation
campaigns is grounded on a narrow and unrealistic view of the relationship
between unions and employees. The purpose of the ban is to ensure that,
when employees vote on whether to have union representation, the
employees are not distracted by extraneous benefits, but base decisions
solely on their assessment of what type of representative the union would
provide for their work environment. That purpose conflicts with the reality
that providing a workplace representative is just one of many ways that
unions assist employees. Allowing unions to provide benefits during
representation campaigns would give employees a fuller and more accurate
3. See generally 52d St. Hotel Assocs., 321 N.L.R.B. 624 (1996); Nestle Dairy
Systems, 311 N.L.R.B. 987 (1993), enf. denied, 46 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 1995). But see
Freund Baking Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Nestle Ice Cream Co. v.
NLRB, 46 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 1995).
4. See Michael Carlin, Note, Are Union-FinancedLegal Services Provided Priorto a
Representation Election an Impermissible Grant of Benefit?: An Analysis of Nestle,
Novotel, and Freund, 79 N.C.L. REV. 551 (2001).
5. See Catherine L. Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment Law, 23 Berkeley J. Emp. &
Lab. L. 57 (2002).
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1)(2002).
7. Section 7 gives employees "the right to refrain from any or all" activities in support
of a union. Id. at § 157. Section 8(b)(1)(A) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a
union "to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
Id.
I.."
at § 158(b)(l)(A).
7 ..
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understanding of how a union would impact not only their jobs, but their
lives.
This article's proposal to open the door to unconditional union
benefits during an organizing campaign will likely be controversial. Part of
the controversy stems from the fact that the proposal would reverse a legal
rule that has been in place for more than thirty years. A greater source of
controversy will be that the proposal would allow unions to do something
that employers are forbidden to do. Currently, both unions and employers
are prohibited from granting employees unconditional benefits during an
organizing campaign. Removing that prohibition just for unions would no
doubt spur complaints by employers and their representatives, who would
argue that the prohibitions on each side are currently equivalent,8 and it
would therefore be unfair and unreasonable to remove the limit for just one
side.
Such arguments are erroneous. The ban on employer grants and the
ban on union grants are actually quite distinct, particularly in their origins
and purposes. The main rationale for the ban on employer grants of
benefits, as established by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Exchange Parts,
is that such grants are implicitly threatening to employees. 9 Unions,
because they lack the kind of control over the work environment that
employers have, are not in a position to use benefit grants to threaten
employees. Consequently, very different rationales underlie the ban on a
union's grant of benefits. This article takes no position on whether the ban
on employer benefits should be repealed, but Part IV explains why it may
be reasonable to remove the prohibition for unions while maintaining the
prohibition for employers.
Although the proposal to allow union grants of benefits is
controversial, it is also feasible. The change in law would not require any
action by Congress or even by a court, but could be effectuated by the
NLRB. A statutory amendment is unnecessary because, as already noted,
there is no provision in the NLRA that expressly restricts unconditional
union grants of benefits. The only provision in the statute that even refers
to benefits is Section 8(c), the "free speech" provision, which says that an
expression of views cannot be used as evidence of an unfair labor practice
unless the expression contains a "threat of reprisal" or "a promise of
benefit."'
In the legislative history of the NLRA, there is hardly any
discussion of the promise of benefit language, except for brief references to

8. See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text (discussing statements by the Board
and courts to the effect that the ban on union and employer grants of benefits are
equivalent).
9. NLRB v. Exchange Parts, Inc., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2002).
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employer bribery or discrimination." Therefore, there is no ground for
finding that Congress intended the statute to prohibit unions from providing
unconditional benefits and assistance during an organizing campaign.
Additionally, the Board's removal of the ban would not breach any
Supreme Court precedent. The Court's only decision addressing union
grants of benefits, NLRB v. SavairMfg. Co.,12 involved conditionalbenefits
that were provided only to employees who signed recognition slips
The Court found those conditional benefits
supporting the union.
constituted objectionable conduct that justified overturning the union's 2220 election victory. 3 Not only is Savair's holding limited to conditional
benefits, but as discussed more fully in Part II, the main rationales for the
Court's conclusion logically apply only to benefits conditioned on an
Thus, with regard to
employee's demonstration of union support.
unconditional grants of benefits by unions, the Court's statements in Savair
are at best dicta, and do not constrain the Board from revising or repealing
its ban.
The Board is also not constrained by circuit court decisions applying
the rule against union benefits. As long as the Board sets forth a "reasoned
explanation" for its change in policy, the circuit courts should defer to that
change. 14 Congress intended the Board to dominate over the courts in
making policy in the labor union arena, and judicial deference to Board
policies is required both by the NLRA and the prevailing legal standards on
judicial review of administrative agency decisions.
This article proposes a policy change that the Board has full authority
to carry out. The Board, in fact, created the prohibition on union grants of
benefits 16 and it should now revisit this policy. The prohibition is harmful
to employees and limits their ability to make a fully informed and wellreasoned choice in representation elections.

11. See Charles C. Jackson & Jeffrey S. Heller, Promises and Grants of Benefits Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 50-51 & nn.208-13
(1982)(summarizing and citing the legislative history).
12. 414 U.S. 270 (1973).
13. Id.
14. See Chelsea Indus. v. NLRB, 285 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2002)(holding that
"[t]he Board is at liberty to change its policies as long as it justifies the change with a
'reasoned explanation"')(quoting Micro Pacific Dev. Inc. v. NLRB, 178 F.3d 1325, 1336
(D.C. Cir. 1999)).
15. See Michael J. Hayes, After "Hiding the Ball" Is Over: How the NLRB Must
Change Its Approach to Decision-Making, 33 RUTGERs L.J. 755, 784-93 (2002).
16. See Wagner Electric Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 532, 533 (1967); General Cable Corp.,
170 N.L.R.B. 1682, 1682-83 (1968).
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II.

EVALUATING THE RATIONALES FOR THE PROHIBITION ON UNION
GRANTS OF BENEFITS

A.

Introduction

Union grants of benefits are sometimes referred to by the NLRB and
the courts as "bribes' ' 17 or "purchases of votes."" s Given that vote
purchasing in general elections is a crime under federal law and under the
laws of most states' 9 and that bribery is criminal in many contexts, finding
that union benefit grants are bribes to voters would seem to be a sufficient
ground to declare them illegal or objectionable in representation elections.
However, the term "bribery" is both too narrow and too broad to serve as
the basis for barring union grants of benefits. If used in the strict sense of a
direct quid pro quo, where the benefit is provided as consideration for an
action by the recipient, then bribery does not include unconditional grants
of benefits by unions. As noted earlier, representation elections are
conducted by secret ballot, therefore a union would be unable to secure an
employee's vote in return for a benefit, as contrasted with, for example, a
bribe paid to a government official for making a public decision or vote.
Moreover, with unconditional benefits, the employee's receipt of the
benefit does not depend on how an employee promises or intends to vote.
If bribery is used in its broadest sense, as a benefit offered or provided
with the goal of the recipient taking a certain action, then union grants of
unconditional benefits would be covered under bribery, but so would many
other forms of union and employer conduct that are currently permitted.
For example, it is perfectly legal for employers to set their wages and other
terms of employment with the goal of discouraging their employees from
unionizing.2 In addition, both employers and unions are allowed to give
employees various types of campaign propaganda, such as buttons and Tshirts,22 even though at least one motive for such gifts is to make the
17. See, e.g., Aventura Country Club, 253 N.L.R.B. 416, 416 (1980)("[A] cash gift or a
bribe ... can serve only to corrupt employees in their choice").
18. See, e.g., Nestle Ice Cream Co. v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 578, 584 (6th Cir. 1995)(holding
that union's provision of legal services "smacked of a 'purchase' of votes").
19. See Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1323, 1324 n.1 (2000).
20. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2002) (bribery of public officials); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 240.1 (1985)(bribery in official and political matters).
21. See Whiteside & Weinberg, Coping with the Unionization Drive: A Guide for the
Careful Employer, 43 THE PRACTICAL LAWYER 45 (1997).
22. See, e.g., NLRB v. Dickinson Press, Inc., 153 F.3d 282, 286-87 (6th Cir.
1998)(finding unions' provision of T-shirts permissible "propaganda"); NLRB v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. Consol., 132 F.3d 1001, 1005-06 (4th Cir. 1997)(finding union's provision of
T-shirts unobjectionable); Okla. Installation Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 776,776 (1992)(finding
employer's distribution of caps and T-shirts permissible).
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recipients more likely to vote for the donor. The law also clearly permits
unions to promise employees a variety of benefits they will receive if the
union wins, even though many bribery statutes equate such offers of
benefits with actual grants.23
Consequently, labeling unions' grants of benefits as "bribes" is not an
adequate basis for prohibiting such grants. The Board and courts must
consider that while unions are barred from granting benefits other employer
and union actions that also fit the common definition of "bribe" are
permitted. The Board and courts should give reasons for the prohibition on
union grants of benefits that justify placing such grants on the
impermissible side of the line.
B.

The Leading Decisions and Their Rationales

The Board first found union grants of unconditional benefits
objectionable in 1967-68, in two cases decided within seven months of
each other, Wagner Electric Corp.24 and General Cable.2 5 In Wagner
Electric, the Board set aside an election won by the Teamsters Union
26
because the union, both before and after the filing of the election petition,
offered employees who "signed up" with the union immediate coverage
through life insurance and funeral benefit policies provided by the union.
The Board found that the union's "gift of immediate life insurance
coverage is a tangible economic benefit" that "subjects the donees to a
constraint to vote for the donor union. 28 In General Cable, the United
Steel Workers gave $5 gift certificates to all employees a few days before
the election, which the Board deemed objectionable because "the gifts were
made as an inducement to support the Petitioner. Such conduct impairs
23. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1962) (amended 1994) (prohibiting any action that
"gives, offers or promises anything of value to any public official") (emphasis added);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1 ("person is guilty of bribery... if he offers, confers or agrees
to confer upon another... any pecuniary benefit as consideration for the recipient's
decision, [etc.]") (emphasis added).
24. Wagner Electric Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 532 (1967).
25. General Cable Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 1682 (1968).
26. See 167 N.L.R.B. at 532 (noting that the union offered benefits on Feb. 2, Feb. 22,
and "after it received the Excelsior list" on March 9 and 10).
27. Technically, the Board could have analyzed Wagner Electric as a "conditional
benefit" case, because the union conditioned this benefit on an employee's manifesting
support for the union (i.e. "signing up"). The Board could have considered how this
condition may have pressured employees to forego their Section 7 right to "refrain from"
openly supporting a union. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935). The Board, however, did not
discuss this condition, or how the condition could have affected employees' exercise of their
Section 7 rights to openly support, or refrain from supporting, the union. Instead, the Board
analyzed how the grantof the benefit might affect employees' secret ballot voting, a line of
reasoning that does not depend on whether the benefit is conditional or unconditional.
28. 167 N.L.R.B. at 533.
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employee free choice."'2 9

As noted earlier, Board elections are by secret ballots, and so there is
no way that a union can know whether an individual voted for or against
the union. Hence, an employee's vote cannot affect whether the union
provides an employee with a benefit. Therefore, when the Board referred
to a "constraint" or "inducement" to vote in favor of the union in Wagner
Electric and General Cable, the Board could not and did not mean that the
employee would feel motivated to vote yes in order to get or keep the
union's benefit. Because the employee gets the benefit regardless of how
she votes, the only logical way that the benefit might "induce" the
employee to vote yes is if the employee believed he or she owed the union
a yes vote in return for the benefit. In subsequent decisions, the Board and
courts have confirmed that the rationale of Wagner Electric and General
Cable is that union-provided benefits may cause employees to vote yes out
of a "sense of obligation" to the union.3 °
The Supreme Court issued its first, and only ruling on the
permissibility of union grants of benefits during representation campaigns
in 1973, in Savair Manufacturing.
In Savair, the Court found
objectionable the union's offer to waive initiation fees for any employees
who signed union authorization cards prior to the election. 32 The Court's
holding in Savair applied only to a conditional benefit, where an
employee's receipt of the benefit depended on that employee's signing a
card. Nonetheless, lower courts and the Board have sometimes relied on
dicta in Savair to support their rulings that unconditional grants of benefits
by unions are illegal or objectionable.33
The Court majority mentioned three rationales for why the union's
offer of the benefit justified overturning the union's election victory. First,
the Court reasoned that by getting employees to sign authorization cards in
return for fee waivers, the union could
"paint a false portrait of employee
• ,34
support during its election campaign."
The Court explained that even
employees who did not support the union might sign the cards in order to
29. 170 N.L.R.B. at 1682-83.
30. See, e.g., Freund Baking Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 928, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(explaining that union "gifts" like free life insurance "constrain[] employees to vote for the
Union out of a sense of obligation"); NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 132 F.3d
1001, 1005 (4th Cir. 1997); Mailing Serv., Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. 565, 566 n.3 (1989) (arguing
that employees who received union-provided benefit "would likely have felt a sense of
obligation to the donor, the Union"); Easco Tools, Inc., 248 NLRB 700, 700-01 (1980);
Gulf State Canners, Inc., 242 NLRB 1326, 1327 & nn.I 1-15 (1979).
31. NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973).
32. Id. at 272-73.
33. See, e.g., Comcast Cablevision v. NLRB, 232 F.3d 490, 495-96 (6th Cir. 2000);
Freund Baking Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 928, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Flatbush Manor Care
Center, 287 N.L.R.B. 457 (1987); Royal Packaging Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 317, 318 (1987).
34. Savair,414 U.S. at 277.
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get the fee waiver, and the union could turn around and use these "false"
manifestations of support as a "useful campaign tool,"35 or even to obtain
representative status without an election.36 This "false portrait" rationale
can logically apply only when union benefits are conditioned, like those in
Savair, on employees' outward manifestation of union support before the
election. When unions grant benefits without such a condition, employees
receive them whether they support the union "falsely," "truly," or not at all,
so unions cannot use the benefits to garner false indications of support.
The Court's second rationale was that after employees have signed the
cards, though they are not legally or formally bound to vote for the union in
the election, "certainly there may be some employees who would feel
obliged to carry through on their stated intention to support the union. 37
Lower courts and the Board have sometimes cited this statement in Savair
as endorsing the position taken in Wagner Electric and General Cable that
union grants of benefits improperly motivate employees to vote for the
union out of a "sense of obligation" to repay the union. However, the
Court in Savair does not say that the employees' feeling of obligation
would be to repay the union, but rather that the employees "would feel
obliged to carry through on their stated intention" expressed in signing the
cards.38 Consequently, like the false portrait rationale, this rationale of
sense of obligation to "carry through" would also apply only when
employees are asked to openly demonstrate union support, and would not
exist when a union proffers benefits without demanding such a
demonstration.
The final rationale the Court majority mentioned was that "[t]he
failure to sign a recognition slip may well seem ominous to nonunionists
who fear that if they do not sign they will face a wrathful union regime,
should the union win. 39 Strictly speaking, this rationale could also be said
to apply only when a union asks employees to "sign" something. Unlike
the other two rationales, though, it could also logically apply to cases of
unconditional benefits, because employees could feel similarly threatened
if they rejected a union benefit. Indeed, this rationale logically applies to
any employee act, or failure to act, that could be interpreted as indicating
lack of support for the union. Consequently, this rationale "proves too
35. Id.
36. Id. at 279-280.
37. Id. at 277-78.
38. Later in the Savair decision, in footnote 6, the Court majority cited Wagner Electric
and General Cable and parenthetically referred to their "constraint" and "inducement"
rationale. The Court, however, did not discuss this rationale at all, and simply cited these
cases in support of the statement that "[t]he NLRB itself has recognized in other contexts
that promising or conferring benefits may unduly influence representation elections." See
414 U.S. at 279 n.6.
39. Savair,414 U.S. at 281.
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much" as a basis for prohibiting union conduct, and probably for this
reason has not subsequently been relied on in cases barring union grants of
benefits.
A couple of years after Savair, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit suggested another rationale for restricting union grants of
benefits that has been followed in subsequent cases. In Basic Wire
Products,40 the Sixth Circuit held that union grants of benefits during
election campaigns were objectionable because "they tend to influence
votes without relation to the merits of the election.",4' Seven years later, in
L & J Equipment,42 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
declared that this "irrelevant to the merits" rationale was the foundation for
the rule against unions providing benefits during election campaigns. The
Third Circuit asserted that the prohibition is "rooted in the idea that an
employee's vote should be governed only by consideration of the
advantages and disadvantages of unionization in his or her work
environment, and not by any extraneous inducements of pecuniary value. 43
In a number of subsequent decisions, courts of appeals and the Board have
identified the "irrelevant to the merits" rationale as a main reason for
curbing union-provided benefits during election campaigns.44
The Sixth Circuit has even established irrelevance to the election's
merits as a requirementfor banning a union benefit, explaining in Comcast
Cablevision-Taylorthat the benefit's lack of relation to the election was the
second part of the "test" for determining whether the benefit justified
setting aside the election. 45 The Sixth Circuit even linked the "irrelevance
to merits" requirement to the "sense of obligation" rationale discussed
previously, indicating that "a benefit impos[ing] a sense of obligation" fails
46
the "merits" test, apparently reasoning that the employees' feelings of
obligation have no relation to the true issues in the election.
Closely related to the "irrelevant to the merits" rationale is a ground
the Sixth Circuit offered in Nestle Ice Cream,47 that it's improper for
employees to vote with the motive of continuing to receive benefits from
the union after the election. The Sixth Circuit held in Nestle that the
,,

40. NLRB v. Basic Wire Prods., Inc., 516 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1975).
41. Id. at 265.
42. NLRB v. L & J Equip. Co., 745 F.2d 224, 231(3rd Cir. 1984).
43. Id. at 231.
44. See, e.g., Comcast Cablevision v. NLRB, 232 F.3d 490, 495 (6th Cir. 2000); Freund
Baking Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 928, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Nestle Ice Cream Co. v. NLRB,
46 F.3d 578, 583 (6th Cir. 1995); 52nd St. Hotel Assocs., 321 N.L.R.B. 624, 635 (1996).
45. See Comcast, 232 F.3d at 495-96. The court said that the first part of the test is that
the benefit must be sufficiently desirable to the offeree "to have the potential to influence
that person's vote." Id. at 495.
46. Id. at 495.
47. Nestle Ice Cream Co., 46 F.3d at 578.
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union's provision of legal services created "the danger" that the benefit
would cause "the employees to feel obliged to vote for the Union simply
out of a desire to continue receiving the benefit."48 The Sixth Circuit went
on to explain that "the employees might vote for the Unions because the
employees hoped that the attorney would continue to pursue that particular
suit, rather than because the Union's overall representation of the
employees - at the negotiating table with the employer, with insurance
49
companies, with legislators, and so forth - merited election.,
The last of the rationales commonly advanced by the Board and courts
to find union provision of benefits objectionable is that union-supplied
benefits disrupt the "laboratory conditions" sought for an election and
therefore impair the employees' free choice.5 ° Professors Derek Bok and
Catherine L. Fisk have described this rationale as the Board's condemning
"crass" or "unseemly" exchanges of union benefits for votes or support. 5
'
When relying on this rationale, the Board and the courts typically resort to
conclusory or moralistic language, such as: "[when] gifts of substantial
value were offered by the Union as part of its campaign, we find that
laboratory conditions did not exist ' 52 or "outright gifts by a union to
prospective members.., have no purpose other than to pervert the
employee's free choice."53 In a few cases, the Board has more specifically
described how the union benefit impairs employees' free choice, and in
these cases the Board has invoked one of the other rationales previously
discussed. For example, the Board indicated in Mailing Services that the
impairment was due to the "sense of obligation" rationale,5 4 while in
Drilco, the Board used reasoning similar to the "irrelevant to the merits"
rationale in holding that a benefit was impermissible because its value was
"so great as to divert the attention of employees away from the election and
its purpose. 5 5

48. Id. at 584.
49. Id. at 585. Professor Catherine L. Fisk has pointed out that with regard to the
specific benefit at issue in Nestle, union lawyers pursuing a lawsuit on behalf of employees,
the concern that the benefit will "continue" only if the union wins the election is misplaced,
because the lawyers would be ethically obligated to maintain the lawsuit on behalf of their
employee-clients. See Fisk, supra note 4, at 91.
50. See, e.g., NLRB v. River City Elevator Co., 289 F.3d 1029, 1031 (7th Cir. 2002).
51. See Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in RepresentationElections
under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 56-57 (1964); Fisk, supra
note 4, at 69.
52. NLRB v. River City Elevator Co., 289 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 2002).
53. NLRB v. Whitney Museum of Am. Art, 636 F.2d 19, 22 (2nd Cir. 1980).
54. Mailing Servs., Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. 565, 565-66 & n.3 (1989).
55. Drilco v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 242 N.L.R.B. 20, 21
(1979).
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Criticisms of Rationales

Both judges and scholars have criticized the prohibition on unions
granting benefits during election campaigns. Usually, though not always,
the critics have questioned the ban on benefit grants by unions and
employers.
56
In a frequently cited 1982 law review article, labor lawyers Charles
C. Jackson and Jeffrey S. Heller contended that "the National Labor
Relations Act ...does not prohibit non-compulsive pre-election efforts by
employers and unions to persuade employees even if those efforts consist
of promises and grants of benefits."" Jackson and Heller were specifically
critical of the rationale that benefit grants might cause employees to vote
with "improper" motivations, such as a sense of obligation or a desire to
continue to receive the benefits. They observed that "[i]n any given case,
no one - including the Board and the courts - knows what motivates the
employee vote."58 Similarly, they pointed out that no one knows how
employees might react to union benefit grants, positing for example that "if
the benefits are conferred only for a short period of time, then the message
conveyed may be that the union is only interested in increasing
membership rolls."'5 9
In questioning the Board's suppositions about employee motivation,
Jackson and Heller relied on the empirical research of Professors Getman,
6
In this famous and controversial 61 study,
0
and Herman.
Goldberg, Getman
and his colleagues examined whether empirical data
Professor

56. See Jackson & Heller, supra note 10. For examples of references to this article by
scholars, see Fisk, supra note 4, at 61 n. 17; Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in
the Law of Workplace Cooperation:From Bureaucraticto Flexible Production, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 753, 783 n.82 (1994); John W. Teeter, Jr., Keeping the Faith: The Problem of
Apparent Bias in Labor Representation Elections, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 909, 961 n.208
(1990)(describing the article as a "provocative critique"); Rebecca Hanner White, Modern
DiscriminationTheory and the National Labor Relations Act, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 99,
108 n.49 (1997).
57. Jackson & Heller, supra note 10, at 66.

58. Id. at 55.
59. Id. at 54-55.
60. See generally JULIUS GETMAN ET AL, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND
REALITY (1976). Jackson and Heller initially cited this study at 131 U. PA. L. REV. at 4
n. 13, and discussed it more fully at 131 U. PA. L. REV.at 54-58.
61. Several scholars wrote an article criticizing the study's methodology, while
Professors Getman, Goldberg and others responded with articles defending the study. See
COX ET AL, LABOR LAW 186-91 (13th ed. 2001); MICHAEL C. HARPER & SAMUEL

ESTREICHER, LABOR LAW 355-58 (4th ed. 1996) (summarizing the articles debating Getman,
Goldberg, and Herman's methodology). In Jackson and Heller's article, they acknowledged
the dispute over the study's methodology, but stressed that "no critic has compiled a study
that disproves the contentions of [Getman, et. al.] and supports traditional NLRB campaign
regulation." 131 U. PA. L. REV. at 57-58 (emphasis in original).
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supported the factual assumptions that undergird many of the Board's
regulations of conduct during election campaigns, including the rule
against grants of benefits. With regard to employers' grants of benefits, the
study found that "[s]uch grants, though commonplace in the elections
studied, had no demonstrable effect on vote., 62 In fact, the study showed
that employees who received promises and grants of benefits from their
employers "were actually more likely to vote for union representation than
were other employees., 63 That finding at least puts in doubt the Board's
view that a grant of benefits by an election party will motivate employees
to vote for that party.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit relied on
the Getman study in 1996, in Skyline Distributors,64 to question the ban on
grants of benefits during election campaigns. In an opinion by Chief Judge
and former labor law professor Harry Edwards, 65 and joined by Circuit
judges Henderson and Tatel, the D.C Circuit observed that "the premise" of
the ban "has been challenged by preeminent labor law scholars, who
question whether certain ULPs [unfair labor practices] do in fact adversely
affect free and uncoerced choice by workers. 66 The court then quoted a
paragraph from the Getman study that explained that the evidence did not
support the Board's and court's assumptions about how employer promises
and grants of benefits affect employees. 67 The D.C. Circuit recognized it
did not have the authority to overturn the ban on benefit grants, 6 8 and so
Skyline Distributorscannot be relied on as precedent for removing that ban.
Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit's criticisms of the ban are significant because
they were extensive, carefully thought out, and were probably more than
dicta because they were an important part of the court's reasoning for its
conclusion that benefit grants are insufficient grounds for a bargaining
order.69 Two years after Skyline Distributors, yet another D.C. Circuit
judge, A. Raymond Randolph, cited the Bok and Gorman article as "severe
criticism" of the rule against grants of benefits during election campaigns.7 °
Professor Getman and others have questioned the accuracy of the
62. GETMAN, supra note 58, at 151.

63. Id.
64. Skyline Distribs. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 403 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
65. See 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, D.C. Cir. Section at 5 (Christine

Housen, et. al. eds. 2002).
66. 99 F.3d at 409.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. The court's statements challenging the validity of the ban were the bases for its
finding that benefits grants are not a "grave violation," which in turn supported the D.C.
Circuit's holding that the Board had erred in ruling that the benefit grants justified the
remedy of a bargaining order. See 99 F.3d at 410-12.
70. See Perdue Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 144 F.3d 830, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Randolph, J.,
dissenting).
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Board's supposition that grants of benefits motivate employees to vote out
of a sense of obligation or fear. Professor Catherine Fisk has challenged
the Board's view that such motivations (assuming they exist) are somehow
improper. In her description of the Board's "sense of obligation" rationale,
Professor Fisk observed that "[o]f course, all union elections are affected in
part by the employees' perception of what is going to be in their economic
best interest - will unionization lead to higher wages and better working
conditions or not?"'7 Later in the article, Professor Fisk renounced the
sense of obligation rationale, asserting that:
[T]o the extent employees feel gratitude to the union for
enforcing their statutory rights, that is precisely the sort of
sentiment that legitimately should influence votes in union
elections. Constituents re-elect their legislators in part because of
what they have done for them. It would be impermissible for
legislators to buy votes for cash, but certainly it is not wrong for
the legislators to offer assistance with government agencies or
other forms of constituent service (as long as the legislator of
course does not abuse her power in doing so).72
In maintaining that employee gratitude and self-interest are
"legitimate" influences in employees' voting, Professor Fisk also implicitly
challenged the rationale that benefit grants cause employees to vote based
on "extraneous" factors that are "irrelevant" to the "merits" of the
election.73 That rationale will be examined and criticized more fully in Part
III.
As critics like Professor Fisk, Professor Getman, and others discussed
in this section have demonstrated, most of the rationales that have been
advanced for barring union benefit grants are based on inaccurate or
questionable assumptions about what employee-voter motivations are or
should be. The only significant rationale not yet discussed is that the ban is
necessary to protect the "laboratory conditions" desired for elections. The
Board and courts, however, have repeatedly acknowledged that laboratory
conditions are an "ideal" that is often impossible to achieve in the real
world.74 Indeed, the Board in Liberal Market, Inc., within only a few years
71. Fisk, supra note 4, at 68.
72. Id. at 90-91.
73. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (discussing the "irrelevant to the
merits" rationale).
74. See, e.g., Avondale Indus. v. NLRB, 180 F.3d 633, 636 (5th Cir. 1999)("[w]hile
'laboratory conditions' represent the ideal, 'clinical asepsis is an unattainable goal in the real
world of union organizational efforts"') (quoting NLRB v. Sumter Plywood Corp., 535 F.2d
917, 920 (5th Cir. 1976)); Amalgamated Servs. v. NLRB, 815 F.2d 225, 227 (2nd Cir. 1987)
("the idea of laboratory conditions must be realistically applied"); NLRB v. Herbert
Halperin Distrib. Corp., 826 F.2d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[w]hile the Board strives to
maintain 'laboratory conditions' ... in reality these conditions are often 'less-than-
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after establishment of the "laboratory conditions" standard, conceded that
"the Board must recognize that Board elections do not occur in a laboratory
where controlled or artificial conditions may be established. 75 In Liberal
Market, the Board described an approach that it has followed many times
since, explaining:
We seek to establish ideal conditions insofar as possible, but we
appraise the actual facts in the light of realistic standards of
human conduct. It follows that elections must be appraised
realistically and practically, and should not be judged against
theoretically ideal, but nevertheless artificial, standards. In this
connection, we note that a realistic appraisal of the effect of
antecedent conduct upon a Board election must, of course, be
concerned with particular acts and their effect upon those of the
voters who are directly involved; it must also be concerned,
however, with the overall picture of how the totality of the
conduct affects not only the voters directly involved, but any
others who may or may not be indirectly affected because they
are within the voting unit. In some cases, a nice balancing of
these considerations may be required.76
Scholars have also observed that the Board's actual regulation of
representation elections is not nearly as strict as the "laboratory conditions"
standard would lead one to believe.7 7
Perhaps the most significant example of the gap between the Board's
aspirational laboratory conditions standard and its actual regulation of
election conduct is the Board's policy that it will not regard employer or

perfect'); Shipowners Assn. of the Pac. Coast, 110 N.L.R.B. 479, 480 (1954) ("[t]he Board
recognizes that realistically elections do not occur under controlled laboratory conditions
and that circumstances surrounding working conditions in various industries require an
adaptation of established standards to those conditions").
75. Liberal Mkt. Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1481, 1482 (1954). Liberal Market was decided
only six years after the Board first set out the "laboratory conditions" standard in General
Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
76. Id. at 1482. For examples of Board decisions relying on Liberal Market and
following its approach, see, Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 130 (1982);
Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 82, 90 & 91 n.28 (1978); Am.
Enka Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 1335, 1343 (1977); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 179 N.L.R.B.
219, 223 (1969).
77. See, e.g., Bok, supra note 49, at 39-41 (discussing variations in how strictly the
Board has applied the "laboratory conditions" standard); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor
and the CorporateStructure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities,55 U. CHI.
L. REv. 73, 166 n.377 (1988) ("the NLRB has weakened its approach to regulation of
election conduct, and has softened its approach to the problem of coercion."); James W.
Wimberly, Jr. & Martin H. Steckel, NLRB Campaign Laboratory Conditions Doctrine and
Free Speech Revisited, 32 MERCER L. REV. 535 (1981) (discussing the history of the
application of the laboratory conditions standard).
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union misrepresentations as objectionable conduct. 78 Under this policy, the
Board has allowed false pre-election statements that could logically be
expected to have a major influence on voters, such as a union's statement
that "[t]he National Labor Relations Board of the Unite States of America
wants the workers [of the Respondent company] to have a union, 79 an
employer's false assertion that the union would charge every new member
an initiation fee,80 and an employer's untrue statements that the union's
officials had caused violent, disastrous strikes at other companies.8 Thus,
in cases of misrepresentation and in other contexts, the Board and courts
have been less than rigorous in requiring that parties truly conform to the
idealized "laboratory conditions" standard. Consequently, in terms of
justifying the Board's prohibition on union grants of benefits, the Board's
bare invocation of the laboratory conditions standard is quite unconvincing.
At the very least, it is incumbent on the Board to explain why union grants
of benefits are more destructive of employee freedom of choice than
misrepresentations and other election conduct the Board allows, and this
the Board has never done.
In addition to the conceptual problems with the rationales that have
been advanced to support the prohibition on union grants of benefits, a very
serious practical problem is that the prohibition is applied inconsistently
and unpredictably. Professor Catherine Fisk has cogently summarized
some of the inexplicable distinctions between what has been allowed and
what has not. Regarding union benefits, she observed that "giving away
union jackets costing $16 each, or $5 gift certificate is not permissible, but
giving away T-shirts is. Hosting a modest party on or about election day is
permissible; hosting a lavish party is not. 8 2 With regard to employer
benefits, Professor Fisk noted that, for no clear reason, employers can
provide transportation to enable employees to vote, but cannot provide
child care for the same purpose." These sorts of mystifying distinctions
between the permissible and impermissible lead Professor Fisk to conclude
that "the whole body of law about pre-election benefits is, at best, fraught
with difficulty and, at worse, an incoherent trap for the unwary. 8 4
For unions, there are "incoherent" and irrational precedents governing
some of the most common union practices in representation elections. One
crucial issue is unconditional waivers of fees and dues, which unions
regularly provide in election campaigns. The Board and courts permit such
78.
policy);
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982) (the case establishing the
Hardin, supra note 2, at 350-52 (discussing cases applying the policy).
TEG/LVI Envtl. Servs., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1469, 1469 & n.2 (1998).
Allied Stores Corp., 308 N.L.R.B. 184, 200 (1992).
Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. at 128.
Fisk, supra note 4, at 71-72 & nn.71-72.
Id. at 72-73.
Id. at 73.
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issue is whether the union will
waivers in certification elections, where the
15
However, in decertification
become the employees representative.
elections, where the issue is whether the union will continue to represent
employees, the Board has barred waiver of back dues.
The Board's rule allowing unconditional waiver of fees and dues in
86
certification elections was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Savair. The
Court reasoned that such waivers were permissible during an election
campaign because "'employees otherwise sympathetic to the union might
well [be] reluctant to pay out money before the union ha[s] done anything
for them" and waiver of fees and dues "would remove this artificial
obstacle to their endorsement of the union.' ' 8 7 In many subsequent cases,
the Board and courts have relied on this "removal of artificial obstacle"
principle, to allow unions to waive fees and dues for employees in
88
certification election campaigns.
By contrast, the Board established a ban on such waivers in
decertification elections in Loubella Extendables.89 In Loubella, the union
won a decertification election petitioned for by the employer, but the Board
majority overturned the union's victory because the union informed new
employees, who had not yet paid union fees or dues, that the union would
not seek to collect those delinquencies, should the union win the upcoming
election. 90 The Board majority reasoned that the union's "forgiveness" of
the delinquencies "constitutes a grant of financial benefit which is
indistinguishable from other grants of immediate benefit which we have
found to be objectionable union conduct."'" The Board reaffirmed the ban
in McCarty Processors,92 where the Board overturned the union's win in a
decertification election because during the campaign, after the employer
stopped "checking off' dues, 93 the union informed employees that it would
85. See Jackson & Heller, supra note 10, at 22 & n. 99.
86. NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973).
87. Id. at 272 n.4. (quoting Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 345 F.2d 264,
268 (2d Cir. 1969)).
88. See, e.g., NLRB v. River City Elevator Co., 289 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 2002);
Associated Ready Mixed Concrete v. NLRB, 108 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1997); NLRB v.
Whitney Museum of Am. Art, 636 F.2d 19, 21 (2d Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Con-Pac, Inc., 509
F.2d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1975); Ida Lace, Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. 211, 211 & n.6 (1985); Plastic
Composites Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 728, 728 (1974).
89. Loubella Extendables, Inc., 206 NLRB 183, 184 (1973).
90. Id. at 183-84 & n.9. There was also no evidence that the union ever indicated to
employees that it would try to collect on the delinquencies if it lost the election and thus was
no longer the collective bargaining representative of the employees. To the contrary, after
the evidentiary hearing, "the Regional Director noted a lack of evidence that the Union
Id. at 184 (Fanning, Member,
collected from employees it no longer represented."
dissenting).
91. Id. at 183.
92. 286 N.L.R.B. 703, 703 (1987).
93. "Check-off system" refers to a "procedure by which an employer deducts union
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not seek to collect back dues for the period after checkoff ceased. 94 The
Board found that the union's "waiver of accrued back dues.., constituted
the granting of a financial benefit analogous to" such objectionable benefits
as jackets or gift certificates. 95
In cases prohibiting union waiver of back dues in decertification
elections, the Board has completely disregaided the Supreme Courtendorsed principle that it is legitimate for unions to "remove artificial
obstacles" to employee support, which the Board has repeatedly invoked
when allowing union dues waivers in certification elections.96 The Board's
departure from this accepted principle in decertification elections is
unjustified because back dues are just as much an "artificial obstacle" for
an incumbent union in a decertification election, as dues and initiation fees
are for a prospective union in a certification election.
In certification elections, when unions waive dues, they commonly
explain that the waiver will be in effect until the negotiation of a contract.97
98
That is because unions recognize, as the Supreme Court did in Savair,
that employees are "reluctant" to be obliged to pay dues in the period
before the union has done something for them, namely, negotiated better
employment terms and conditions. This creates a concern for the union, a
concern that Savair called "legitimate," 99 that even employees who desire
union representation may vote "no" in order to avoid paying dues before
they have a contract.
Unions in decertification elections have the same concern. As a result
of the Board's "contract bar" doctrine,'0° decertification elections usually
occur when there is not a collective bargaining agreement in effect.'O° At
dues directly from the employees wages and remits those dues to the union." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 231 (7th ed. 1999).
94. McCarty Processors, 286 N.L.R.B. at 703.
95. Id. at 703 (citing Owens-Illinois, 271 N.L.R.B. 1235, 1235 (1984) and Gen. Cable
Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 1682, 1682 (1968)).
96. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Farrell v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 888 F.2d 459, 460 (6th Cir. 1989);
NLRB v. L.D. McFarland Co., 572 F.2d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Con-Pac, Inc.,
509 F.2d 270, 272-73 (5th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Wabash Transformer Corp., 509 F.2d 647,
649-50 (8th Cir. 1975); Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Workers Int'l Union, Local 213,
261 N.L.R.B. 773, 782 (1982); Polyflex M Co., 258.NLRB 806, 807 (1981); Tri-State
Mech., Inc., 1995 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 1028, at p.*159 (A.L.J. William J. Pannier III, Oct. 18,
1995); Aero Indus., Inc., 1992 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 1107, at p.'76 (A.L.J. Howard Edelman,
Sept. 21, 1992).
98. Savair,414 U.S. at 272-74 n.4.
99. Id.
100. Under the contract bar doctrine, a "current and valid contract will ordinarily prevent
the holding of an election." Hardin, supra note 2, at 523 (1992).
101. See Douglas Ray, Industrial Stability and Decertification Elections: Need for
Reform, 1984 Ariz. St. L.J. 257, 263-68 (discussing times when decertification elections can
occur).
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that time, a union has reason to worry that employees will believe the union
is "doing nothing" for them. For example, the union in McCarty Processors
informed employees it was waiving dues for months when employees have
been without a
contract. 10 2 In a decertification election, dues give
employees an even greater incentive to vote "no" because a union victory
could result not only in employees paying dues after the election, but also
being held liable for dues that accrued preceding the election. °3 Therefore,
unions in decertification elections share the "legitimate" interest in
removing dues as an "artificial obstacle" to employee support, but the
Board forbids this practice'0 4
Even more important than the Board's inconsistent positions on dues
waivers is the tendency to mischaracterize union promises of benefits as
actual grants of benefits. This is a serious error because the law on union
promises of benefits is supposed to be more permissive than union grants
of benefits. Indeed, the general rule is that unions are totally free to make
promises to employees about the benefits they will receive, if the union is
elected as their representative.1 0 5 The Board and courts invalidly restrict
that freedom when they view a union's promise of benefit as an actual
benefit grant.
• •
106
Recently, in Comcast Cablevision-Taylor, 6 the Sixth Circuit voided a

union's election victory because the union announced prior to the election
that it would pay the transportation and hotel expenses of employees to
attend a cable industry meeting in Chicago. 10 7 The court applied the "grant
of benefits" analysis to the Chicago trip, comparing it to cases where
unions provided hats, T-shirts or jackets.108 However, unlike the employees
in those cases, the employees in Comcast Cablevision did not receive the
benefits before they voted, because the trip and meeting occurred "the
102. McCarty Processors,286 N.L.R.B. at 704.
103. Member Fanning recognized this in his dissent in Loubella Extendables, stating that
"[t]he appeal of forgiveness of accrued dues, 'if the Union wins,' is a mixed appeal which
does not necessarily constitute a grant of financial benefit. .. To an employee mainly
seeking relief from back dues, a 'No' vote isapt to achieve that result without future
obligations much more appealingly than a 'Yes' vote with the assumption of dues
obligations for an indeterminate time in the future if the Union wins." 206 N.L.R.B. at 184
(Fanning, dissenting).
104. The Board's rules on grants of dues waivers are rendered all the more unintelligible
by the Board's creation of an exception allowing unions to waive back dues during election
campaigns for employees whose dues liability accrued while working for a different
employer than the one involved in the election. See, e.g., Associated Ready Mixed
Concrete, Inc., 108 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1997); Andal Shoe, 197 N.L.R.B. 1183
(1972).
105. Carlin, supra note 3, at 554 & n.17 (2001).
106. Comcast Cablevision v. NLRB, 232 F.3d 490, 490 (6th Cir. 2000)
107. Id. at 492-93.
108. Id. at 496 (citing NLRB v. Shrader's, Inc., 928 F.2d 194, 194 (6th Cir. 1991) and
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 1235, 1235 (1984)).
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weekend following the election."' 0 9 Interestingly, in the course of the Sixth
Circuit's opinion, the court referred approvingly to the Board's ruling in
Mailing Services that "[a]lthough the union was free to promise employees
that they would receive this benefit.., the union was precluded from
providing [the benefit] to them shortly before the election."" The Sixth
Circuit completely overlooked this significant distinction between
"promise" and "provision" when it determined the union's announcement
of a trip was an objectionable benefit."'
Comcast Cablevision
demonstrates that the Board is not immune from mistaking promises of
benefits for grants of benefits, since the Board concluded that the union
provided a permissible benefit." 12
In sum, the underlying rationales for the prohibition on union grants of
benefits are all conceptually flawed, and the prohibition itself is applied
erratically. The case for retaining the prohibition is therefore, extremely
weak.
III. THE CORE ISSUE: "RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS" FOR VOTERS

A.

How the Board and Courts Draw the Line: Defining a "Sphere of
Relevance"

As noted earlier," 3 the Board's and courts' prohibition of union grants
of benefits contrasts with their acquiescence to other forms of employer
and union conduct that have the same objective of persuading employees to
vote a certain way. To justify the conclusion that union grants of benefits
are an objectionable form of persuasion, the Board and courts have
typically offered one or more of the rationales discussed in Part II.11 4 These

109. Id. at 493.
110. Id. at 497-98 (quoting Mailing Servs., Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. 565, 565-66 (1989))
(emphasis added).
111. Arguably, the Sixth Circuit could have found the promise of the trip objectionable,
based on a line of cases that deem objectionable union promises of benefits that are not
ordinarily provided to union members and that are contingent on the union winning the
election. See, e.g., Trencor, Inc. v. NLRB, 110 F.3d 268, 268 (5" Cir. 1997)(union's
promise to hold "biggest party in the history of Texas" if the union won); Crestwood Manor,
234 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1097 (1978)(discussing union's promise to hold a raffle for a $100 prize
if union won). The Sixth Circuit, however, did not rely on these or any other "promise of
benefit" cases, and erroneously analyzed the union's announcement of the trip solely as a
grant of benefit.
112. Comcast Cablevision, 232 F.3d at 494- 495 (Regional Director and Board found
that trip was too insubstantial to affect employees' votes).
113. See infra Part II.A.

114. See supra notes 23-54 and accompanying text. Research by Professor Catherine L.
Fisk also demonstrates that these have been the virtually exclusive rationales given for
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justifications for the prohibition against union grants of benefits reflect a
concern that the union's provision of a benefit may instill either a sense of
obligation in an employee or a desire to continue receiving the benefit. The
possibility that one of those motives might impact employee voting violates
the "lthboratory conditions" standard for elections because those motives
are irrelevant to the merits of a representation election.
The Board and courts have drawn the line between permissible and
impermissible forms of persuasion by defining properly relevant
Campaign conduct that
considerations for representation elections.
stimulates voter considerations outside this "sphere of relevance," such as
union grants of benefits, can appropriately be proscribed. Of course, once
the Board and courts undertook to define this sphere, they had to set its
boundaries. In union grants of benefits cases, both the Board and courts
have limited the sphere of relevance "spatially" - to what the union could
do for employees in their work environment. The courts and, less
frequently, the Board have also limited the sphere "temporally" - to what
the union could do after the election should it win.
The Board in 52nd St. Hotel Assocs. declared that "[tihe common
thread running through all these cases [of union benefit grants]" was the
following precept stated by the Third Circuit in L & J Equipment: "an
employee's vote should be governed only by consideration of the
advantages and disadvantages of unionization in his or her work
environment, and not by any extraneous inducements of pecuniary
value."' 15 The Board next stated that the union's suit for overtime pay "did
not offend this policy because the legal services it provided were integral to
the workers' employment-related concerns," and therefore the lawsuit was
distinguishable from benefits like medical testing and life insurance that are
"extraneous to efforts to vindicate employment-related concerns ....,116
The employees' workplace is the "spatial" limit of relevance; any union
prohibiting unions' unconditional grants of benefits during election campaigns. Professor
Fisk identified "[flour dominant concerns" that the Board and courts have relied on to
justify barring grants of benefits by employers or unions. Two of those concerns - that
benefits can be used as an implied threat or to "create a false picture of substantial support"
- do not logically apply to union grants of unconditional benefits. The other two concerns that benefits may motivate an employee's vote and that "crass economic inducements" are
"unseeml[y]" - overlap with the rationales discussed in this section. See Fisk, supra note 4,
at 68-70.
115. 52nd St. Hotel Assocs., 321 N.L.R.B. 624, 635 (1996) (emphasis added) (quoting
NLRB v. L & J Equipment Co., 745 F.2d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 1984)).
116. Id. at 635. Here, the Board stated, "Of course, this would be a very different case if
it had been established that the [union] granted employees legal services for matters
unrelated to their efforts to improve their terms and conditions of employment, such as a
divorce proceeding or a personal injury lawsuit." Id. at 635 n.57. The Board then cited
NLRB v. Madisonville Concrete Co., 552 F.2d 168 (6th Cir. 1977) (finding objectionable the
union's provision of legal services to an employee for a traffic ticket).
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efforts to assist employees other than improving conditions in their work
environment are "extraneous".
With regard to the "temporal" limit preventing unions from assisting
employees until after the election, the Board's decisions have been mixed.
It should be noted that the Board in 52nd St. Hotel Assocs. held that a union
was permitted to assist employees with a lawsuit before the election as long
as the suit involved "employment-related concerns". "7 The Board made
similar rulings in three other cases in the 1990s"', but for a number of
reasons, the Board's rulings in these cases can only serve as authoritative
precedent for lawsuits." 9 The Board rendered a more generally applicable
ruling in 1991 in NTA Graphics,12 rejecting the employer's argument that
the union had engaged in objectionable conduct by paying "sacrifice
benefits" before the election to employee-voters who had allegedly been
unlawfully discharged.' 2 ' The Board based its conclusion that the sacrifice
benefits were unobjectionable on its findings that "sacrifice benefits have
been provided for in the International Union's constitution" and "were a
normal incident of union membership."' 122 The Board distinguished this
holding from its 1989 decision in Mailing Services in which "benefits
apparently were made available to employees regardless of whether they
were union members.' ' 123 The Board then explained: "Nothing in Mailing

Services should be interpreted as indicating that a union will be found to
have interfered with an election merely by providing to its new members,
even during the critical period, benefits to which they would normally be
entitled by virtue of their union membership.' ' 24 Under the rationale of
NTA Graphics, unions could provide employee-voters with any benefits
that the union normally offers to its members, as long as the union could
show they were new members. The Board, however, has never again
followed NTA Graphics in a union grant of benefits case.
In contrast to NTA Graphics, the Board has held in other cases that
unions are barred from providing benefits during election campaigns even
117. 52nd St. Hotel Assocs., 321 N.L.R.B. at 635.
118. See Freund Baking Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 929, 930-31 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(describing Board's ruling in an unpublished decision that it was permissible for union to
sponsor a suit for overtime before the election); BHY Concrete Finishing, Inc., 323
N.L.R.B. 505 (1997) (allowing union to assist employees with a lawsuit before the election);
Nestle Dairy Sys. Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 987 (1993) (finding unobjectionable union's filing a
RICO lawsuit against the employer shortly before the election).
119. See 52nd St. Hotel Assocs., 321 N.L.R.B. at 630-34 (demonstrating that the Board's
decision was largely grounded on its conclusions that pursuit of lawsuits to improve
employment conditions is protected by the First Amendment and Section 7 of the NLRA).
120. See NTA Graphics Inc., 303 N.L.R.B. 801 (1991).
121. Id. at 803.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 803-04 n.14 (citing Mailing Servs. Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. 565 (1989)).
124. Id. at804.
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125
if those benefits are or could be ordinarily extended to union members.
In Wagner Electric, a regional director had found that the life insurance
benefits at issue were "merely an incident of membership" that the union
was extending to new members. 116 The Board did not dispute the director's
factual finding that the union provided the insurance benefits to its
members, but the Board nonetheless overruled the regional director and
held that the benefit was a "gift" and therefore objectionable. 127 More than
twenty years later, in Mailing Services, the Board held it objectionable for
the union to offer employees pre-election health screenings even though the
union often provided such screenings to employees in bargaining units it
represented. 1 8 The Board found that it did not matter whether the union
provided such screenings only to employees for whom it was the exclusive
bargaining representative, or to union members generally, because the
union was barred from providing benefits to what the Board called
"potential members" before an election. 29 The Board noted that while
unions can "promise an existing benefit to new members" or "publicize an
existing incident of union membership," the union cannot actually provide
membership benefits before the election.13 °
The courts, meanwhile, have unequivocally held that unions cannot
provide membership benefits to employee-voters prior to the election.
Both the D.C. Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have held recently that unions
"may not give voters 'free samples' of benefits before an election. ' The
Sixth Circuit additionally declared that "[i]t is also no defense that 3the
2
benefit granted could have been routinely extended to Union members."'
The D.C. Circuit in Freund not only condemned "free samples," but
also definitely limited the sphere of relevance both "spatially" and
"temporally."' 13 3 The D.C. Circuit stated that employees' votes should be
based "upon an assessment of the merits of union representation, , 134 and
the court went on to make clear that by "representation" it meant only the
union's ministering to employees after the election and within the
workplace. 15 In holding that the union was barred from pursuing a lawsuit
on behalf of employees, the court certainly showed that it did not broadly

125. See, e.g., Wagner Elec. Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 532 (1967); Mailing Servs. Inc., 293

N.L.R.B. 565 (1989).
126. Wagner Elec. Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. at 533.
127. Id.
128. See Mailing Servs., Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. at 565.

129. Id. at 565.
130. Id. at 565-66.
131.
Baking
132.
133.
134.
135.

Comcast Cablevision v. NLRB, 232 F.3d 490, 496 (6th Cir. 2000); See also Freund
Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 929, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Comcast Cablevision, 232 F.3d at 496.
See FreundBaking 165 F.3d at 935.
Id. at 932.
Id. at 935.
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define "representation" as union service to employees, or even as a union
acting as the employees' agent in forums other than workplace dealings
with the employer. In addition, though the court observed that the "union's
willingness to prosecute a suit" was "relevant" to the election, the court
explained this was only because "it helps employees to evaluate the
likelihood that representation by a particular union will improve those
[employees'] conditions."'' 3 6 With this wording, and with Freund's
reference to pre-election benefits as "free samples," the D.C. Circuit
manifested its view that "representation" was something that would occur
in the future, and that union aid to employees before the election and
outside the workplace (i.e. in court) was merely a hint of how the union
would represent employees after the election. Because the NLRA provides
that all Board decisions are subject to appeal to the D.C. Circuit, 13 7 the
holding in, and reasoning of, Freund has since constrained the Board and
other courts from adopting any other position on union benefit grants.
B.

The Reality: Employee ConsiderationsBeyond the "Sphere of
Relevance"

The Board's and courts' narrow definition of the "sphere or
relevance," limiting it to the union's role in addressing conditions in the
workplace only after it has been elected or recognized as the employees'
exclusive bargaining representative, erroneously disregards a major
dimension of the relationship between unions and employees. As noted at
this article's outset, the raison d'etre for unions is to assist employees.
Moreover, the forms of assistance unions provide to employees are not
now, and never have been, limited to the work environment and to
representing employees vis-a-vis their employers.
History professor
Dorothy Sue Cobble has studied the pre-NLRA history of the American
Federation of Labor (AFL) and its affiliated unions, and found that
"[h]istorically, collective bargaining was one of many methods used by
unions to raise the living standards of American workers. Similarly,
securing a formal trade agreement with an employer, while desirable, was
not the defining feature of unionism."' Professor Cobble has shown that
136. Id. at 933 (emphasis added).
137. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (2002). See also Carlin, supra note 3, at 570-71
(positing that the D.C. Circuit's Freund decision effectively closes the door to unionprovided legal representation for employee-voters before an election).
138. Dorothy Sue Cobble, Lost Ways of Unionism, in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT 82,
90 (Lowell Turner et al. eds., 2001). The "lost ways" to which Professor Cobble refers are
not the forms of union-provided worker assistance, but rather the organizing, by unions, of
the self-employed and unemployed, and the direct affiliation of local unions with the AFL
instead of through a parent international. See id. at 87-89. See also Dorothy Sue Cobble,
Lost Ways of Organizing: Reviving the AFL's Direct Affiliate Strategy, 36 INDUS. REL. 278
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many unions provided assistance mostly in the form of "benevolent
functions," such as "relief to the sick, burial benefits, unemployment
assistance, training, and job referrals."13 9 A few unions also "set up
community arbitration boards to mediate wage and other disputes between
individual members and local employers." 14°
This union tradition, of providing benefits and assistance to employees
outside the work environment, continues to the present day. Several unions

still perform the "benevolent functions" they began in the 19th century, by
providing workers and their families with illness, disability or death
benefits that are funded and paid directly by the union and not through any
employer.' 41 Many unions support and staff legal services programs for
their members, in which the legal assistance is not primarily for workplace
issues, but for matters like real estate transactions, personal bankruptcy,
and family law. 142 Most comprehensively, since 1986 the AFL-CIO and its
affiliated unions have offered, through the Union Privilege program, an
array of benefits and services to union members and their families. These
programs include loans and other financial services, many types of
insurance, and a health savings program.141
Aside from benefits and services outside the workplace, unions also
extend assistance to nonunion employees. An important example is legal
representation: Professor Catherine Fisk described union efforts to enforce
employment laws in nonunion workplaces as "for most employees ... the
most significant role that unions play today," and she identified several
(1997).
139. Cobble, Lost Ways of Organizing, supra note 138, at 291. See also John Fabian
Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident Law: Classical Tort Law and the
Cooperative First Party Insurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 690, 791-95 (2001)
(discussing trade union insurance and benefits funds in the late-19th and early-20th
centuries).
140. Cobble, Lost Ways of Organizing, supra note 138, at 291.
141. See, e.g., Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 453-54 (1984)
(discussing the union's direct provision of death benefits "rather than seeking them from the
employer"); Snyder v. Freight, Constr., Gen. Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local No.
287, 175 F.3d 680, 683 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing sick and death benefits provided directly
by the union); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Tile Helpers Union Local 88,
803 F. Supp. 601, 605 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing unions' establishment of death and
mortuary benefits); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 776 (Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.),
324 N.L.R.B. 1154, 1155 (1997) (mentioning union's maintenance of a "death benefit"
funded by union dues).
142. See, e.g., UAW Legal Service Plans, available at http://www.uawlsp.com (last
visited on July 19, 2002). It is interesting to note that even in 52nd St. Hotel Assocs., where
the Board found that "employment-related" litigation was permissible, the Board indicated
that legal services for "unrelated" matters like a "divorce proceeding or personal injury
lawsuit" would be objectionable. 52nd St. Hotel Assocs., 321 NLRB 624, 635 n.57 (1996).
The Board apparently regarded those services commonly offered by unions in legal services
plans as being outside the "sphere of relevance".
143. See http://www.unionplus.org (last visited July 17, 2002).
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recent examples of unions and their lawyers representing nonunion workers
in litigation.' 44 The United Mine Workers' commitment to provide legal
aid to miners, in union and nonunion workplaces, is even enshrined in its
constitution. 145 Unions also assist nonunion workers in other ways. Many
unions support and staff twenty-four hour referral systems for workers with
emotional and personal problems. 146
In alliance with educational
institutions, unions offer literacy and adult education programs. 147
These are just some of the multitude of benefits and services that
unions provide to employees outside their workplaces. Unions' "extraworkplace" assistance to employees is a vital element of the relationship
between unions and workers. Yet the Board and courts have based their
decisions in union grants of benefits cases on the principle that extraworkplace benefits must be absent4 from the employees' consideration when
voting in representation elections. 1
The Board and courts do not completely ignore unions' extraworkplace benefits. Instead, they treat such benefits as something unreal
and counterfeit, calling them "samples" or "extraneous.' ' 149 The Board and
courts have concluded that these are artificial considerations and have
banned extra-workplace benefits during representation elections. o It is
only in the Board's and courts' conception, however, that extra-workplace
benefits are mere "samples." In the real world, extra-workplace benefits
are certainly concrete and important to the workers and their families who
receive them. From these workers' points of view, forms of extraworkplace assistance are as real and as important as the union's service as
the "bargaining representative" is in the workplace. For workers, for
unions, and for society, there is nothing artificial about extra-workplace
benefits. Rather, what is contrived and unnatural is the Board's and courts'
rule preventing employee-voters from experiencing and appreciating the
same kinds of union extra-workplace benefits that thousands of workers
already enjoy all around the country.
At the core of the prohibition on union grants of benefits is the
apparent assumption that in an NLRB representation election, all that is

144. See Fisk, supra note 4, at 59 & nn.7-10.
145. See 52nd St. Hotel Assocs., 321 N.L.R.B. at 629.
146. ARTHUR B. SHOSTAK, ROBUST UNIONISM 141 (1991).
147. Id. at 158-61. See also Samuel Leiken, New Jobs for Labor Unions, N.Y. TIMES,

Aug. 31, 2002, at A15 (advocating that union greatly expand their role in providing
educational and career guidance services to nonunion employees).
148. See supra notes 116-129 and accompanying text (discussing Board and court
decisions limiting the "sphere of relevance" in union elections to what unions can do within
the workplace environment).
149. See Comcast Cablevision, 232 F.3d at 496; Freund Baking Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d
at 933; NLRB v. L & J Equip., 745 F.2d 224, 321 (3d Cir. 1984).
150. See supra notes 116-129 and accompanying text.
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relevant to voters is the kind of workplace representative the union will be
for them. While this is a plausible theory, in actuality it is incorrect. The
assumption posits that when employees prepare to vote, all they need to
know and think about is what the workplace will be like if the union wins.
Employees, though, should have the right to know and even experience
what their lives will be like, in and out of the workplace, if the union wins.
The current law on union grants of benefits imposes an unrealistic
barrier between what unions do for employees inside the workplace and
what they do for employees outside the workplace.
Such
compartmentalization simply does not exist in the real world. First, a
union's function of representing employees in the workplace and providing
other forms of assistance beyond it are interrelated. A union's capacity to
provide extra-workplace assistance to employees is considerably enhanced
by attaining representative status. Without representative status, a union
"
usually has no right to access the workplace15
' or to obtain information
15
from the employer.
With representative status, a union acquires rights
both to access and information, 153 which greatly improves a union's ability
to find out what kinds of extra-workplace assistance employees desire and
need. The Union then can deliver that assistance to workers. In addition to
augmenting a union's legal rights, the attainment of representative status
almost certainly raises the union's esteem among employees, and hence
makes them more receptive to obtaining extra-workplace assistance from
the union.
The law does not absolutely prohibit unions from providing extraworkplace benefits to employees they do not represent; the ban ostensibly
applies only during the "critical period" between the filing of an election
petition and the actual election day. The D.C. Circuit emphasized this time
limit in Freund in rejecting the Board's argument that Section 7 of the
NLRA entitled the union to pursue a lawsuit on behalf of employees. The
court responded that "[u]nder the Act contestants in a representation
election are routinely prevented from exercising certain rights during the
brief time when their exercise might interfere with the voters' free
choice.' 54
There are several flaws with the argument that the ban on extraworkplace benefits is reasonable because of its limited duration. First,
151. See Lechmere, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527, 535 (1992).
152. See Hardin, supra note 2, at 673 (no duty arises until the union becomes the
bargaining representative).
153. Regarding the right of access to the workplace, see, e.g., New Surfside Nursing
Home, 330 N.L.R.B. 1146 n. 1 (2000); C.C.E., Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 977 (1995); Holyoke
Water Power Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1985), enforced, 778 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1985). See
also Hardin, supra note 2, at 650-85 (regarding the right to obtain information from the
employer).
154. Freund, 165 F.3d at 934 (emphasis added).
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contrary to the D.C. Circuit's characterization, the critical period is often
not "brief;" Professor Fisk has shown that the critical period frequently
lasts several months, or even longer when there are rerun elections. i5
Moreover, as Professor Fisk also points out, the Board and courts have not
rigorously restricted the ban's application to the critical period, and have
commonly set aside elections based on benefits offered prior to the filing of
the election petition. 56 In addition, even when the ban is limited to the
critical period, it generates many practical problems. For example, as the
Board itself recognized in 52nd Street Hotel Associates, the ban effectively
makes legal assistance impossible at any time. If a lawsuit were filed
before the critical period begins, actions to maintain the lawsuit would
necessarily continue into the critical period, and if the suit was filed after
the election, preparation for the suit would have to occur during the critical
period. 157

As the example of legal assistance demonstrates, prohibiting grants of
benefits, even if just during the critical period, acts to cut off employees
from ongoing receipt of union assistance. Since 1985, the AFL-CIO and
several of its affiliate unions have provided "associate memberships" to
unrepresented employees, through which such employees enjoy the
benefits of credit cards and various types of insurance. 118 For unions to
comply with the law on grants of benefits, whenever a union conducts an
organizing effort at a workplace with one or more associate members, the
union would have to take steps such as suspending those members'
insurance or canceling their credit cards, thus causing serious
inconvenience or worse to those workers and their families. As already
1 59
mentioned, when unions are pursuing lawsuits for nonunion employees
and this interaction leads to organizing activity, current law would require
the union to drop the lawsuit. For the union's lawyers, this would constitute
an ethical violation. 160 Such possibilities are not mere hypotheticals: union
extra-workplace assistance to unrepresented employees often spurs those
employees to explore having the union also become their representative.
155. Fisk, supra note 4, at 67 & n.47 (citations omitted).
156. See id. at 67 & n.48 (citations omitted). Even in Wagner Electric, the seminal case
on prohibiting union grants of benefits, the Board found benefits that the union proffered
before the election petition was filed objectionable. See Wagner Electric, 167 N.L.R.B. at
532 (referring to benefits offered on Feb. 2, 1967).
157. See 52nd St. Hotel Assocs., 321 N.L.R.B. at 638-39. See also Carlin, supra note 3,

at 564 (discussing the Board's reasons for rejecting a "bright line rule" barring lawsuits only
during the critical period).
158. See Bill Leonard, The New Face of Organized Labor, 44 HR Magazine 54, July 1,

1999; "AFL-CIO Council Will Receive Report on 'Associate Memberships,"' 23 Daily Lab.
Report (BNA) A-6 (Feb. 4, 1986).
159. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text (discussing examples of suits that
unions and their lawyers have litigated for unrepresented employees).
160. See Fisk, supra note 4, at 91.
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The current prohibition effectively forces such employees to make a
difficult and unreasonable choice between their continued receipt of union
assistance and exercise of their Section 7 right to have a union as their
workplace representative.
In this way, the current prohibition on union grants of benefits stands
as a major obstacle to improving the lives of millions of workers and their
families. To take an especially timely example, unions could make various
forms of insurance available to workers at much lower cost than they could
obtain individually. Unions band thousands of individuals into pools that
lessen the risk to insurers, which in turn leads the insurers to lower their
premiums.16 ' In a time when the number of Americans without health
insurance is often called a "crisis,' 162 one that Congress is wrestling with a
variety of approaches to address, 163 it simply makes no sense to retain a rule
that deters unions from offering insurance to the uninsured.
Another current crisis that unions could help solve is the growing gap
between the new skills required in the American economy and the "older"
skills actually possessed by many American workers.'6 4
Many
commentators have observed that unions are in an excellent position to
65
supply the training and skills-building that millions of workers need.1
161. See, e.g., Witt, supra note 136, at 791-92 (explaining that union accident insurance
plans can overcome adverse selection and moral hazard problems); Greg Tarpinian, Labor's
New Health Care Option, IN THESE TIMES, Mar. 3,1997, at 10 (discussing how pooling of
purchasing power enables unions to purchase insurance on more favorable terms).
162. See, e.g., Jonathan Riskin, Health Coverage Heats Up as Issue: Millions in U.S.
Lack Insurance, Which Could Be a Hot Political Topic, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 15,
2002, at 01A; Peter Deutsch, Solving the Uninsured Crisis, WASH. TIMES, July 28, 2000, at
A15; Robert Kuttner, Incremental Reform Toward What, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 14, 2000, at
4; Jeanne Schulte Scott, The Once and Future Healthcare Crisis, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT.,
July 1998, at 26 (discussing the "coverage crisis" in health insurance).
163. See, e.g., Help for America's Uninsured Act of 2001, H.R. 647, 107th Cong. (2001)
(allowing tax payers to donate portions of their tax refund toward catastrophic care for the
uninsured); Medi-Access Act of 2001, H.R. 1142, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing uninsured
individuals obtain coverage under the Medicaid program); Health Insurance Affordability
and Equity Act of 2001, H.R. 1181, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing incentives for private
health coverage for the previously uninsured).
164. See, e.g., David T. Ellwood, Worksheet for Labor, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2002, at
A23 (contending that because of a growing skills shortage, "[b]usiness and government
must make an unprecedented commitment to develop new training and skills-building
strategies"); U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, H-1B
Technical Skills Training Grants, 66 Fed. Reg. 64859 (Dec. 14, 2001) (announcing the
availability of skills training grants and explaining that "[t]he grants are intended to be a
long-term solution to domestic skill shortages in high skill and high technology
occupations"); Clay Wilson, IT Workers Shortage: Implications for Education Policy,
POL'Y STUD. REV., Sept. 2001, at 167 (discussing "an increasing gap between business
demand for and growth in the supply of Information Technology (IT) workers").
165. See, e.g., Leiken, supra note 144; Katherine V.W. Stone, Employee Representation
in the Boundaryless Workplace, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 773, 808 (2002) (advocating a
greater role for unions in training workers as employees increasingly move from employer
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Again, however, the prohibition on union benefit grants acts as a serious
deterrent, because it requires unions to suspend or terminate these training
services if the union also explores organizing these workers. In preventing
unions from playing a larger role in solving these and other serious
problems, the rule against union benefit grants actually harms society as a
whole.
This harmful prohibition is not required by the National Labor
Relations Act; indeed, it is inconsistent with that Act's fundamental
purpose of enhancing employees' freedom of choice regarding
representation. Under the prohibition, employees involved in an organizing
campaign are not allowed to receive union extra-workplace assistance, or if
they are already receiving it, the union must take it away. This means that
employees are either forced to cast their ballots without having experienced
what it is like to be assisted by a union, or with the bitter experience of
having had such assistance stripped away. Thus, contrary to the assertion
that union benefit grants "pervert the employees' free choice","66 it is the
prohibition on benefit grants that interferes with choice. The prohibition
artificially minimizes the experience employees can have of union
assistance and thus skews employees' perceptions of how a union can
benefit them. Justice Byron White recognized this effect in his dissent in
Savair, contending:
The Court cannot ignore the fact, as well, that § 1 of the National
Labor Relations Act declared the congressional policy of
"encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining." 29 U.S.C. § 151. The existence of unions is an
inescapable corollary of this preference. To the extent that this
Court prohibits the union from promising a fairer deal for
unionized employees by describing the benefits to be obtained by
unionization, this policy is seriously eroded. This Court has
often underscored this preference in the Act. This preference is
only one of opportunity and the free choice of the employee must
be protected, but restrictionson the communications of the union
as to potential
benefits
may unduly prevent the intelligent
,
•
•
167
exercise of such choice.

The prohibition on grants of benefits does impair the employees'
"intelligent exercise" of their choice by lessening their awareness and
understanding of what a union can do for them.

to employer); Eileen Silverstein & Peter Goselin, Intentionally Impermanent Employment
and the Paradoxof Productivity, 26 STETSON L. REV. 1, 57 (1996) (proposing that unions
create employment offices to train workers and help find them jobs).
166. NLRB v. Whitney Mus. of Am. Art, 636 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1980).
167. NLRB v. Savair, 414 U.S. 270, 285 n.4 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
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Many employers take full advantage of this gap in employee
understanding and thus exacerbate the deleterious effects of the ban on
union benefit grants. A popular theme that employers use against unions in
election campaigns is telling employees the union can do nothing
meaningful for them or can offer them nothing but "empty promises."
Even among the representation campaigns that are discussed in Board
decisions, which are just a small fraction of the thousands of representation
campaigns conducted every year, 16 there are scores of cases in which
employers attacked unions with these themes. Employers have made these
arguments to employees both in written communications169 and in
speeches.170 Many employers also bolster the attack by contrasting the
"nothing" available from unions with the hard cash that employees will
have to pay to the unions in the form of dues.'7 1 Of course, employers
never disclose to employees that the law prevents unions from giving them
anything more tangible than these promises. Thus, if a union tells
employees about the extra-workplace assistance that it provides to
168. See, e.g., Number of Union Elections Down in 2001, 116 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C1 (June 17, 2002) (reporting that there were more than 2300 representation elections in
2001).
169. See, e.g., Aircap Mfgs., a Div. of Sunbeam Corp., 287 N.L.R.B. 996, 1017 (1988)
(involving employer letter that told employees to "make a decision on the truth and not on
empty promises"); Diner's Drive-In, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 971, 973 (1986) (involving a letter
from owner to employees that said, "we serve the customers with food - a necessity of life all the union serves is empty promises and disasters"); Progressive Supermkts., Inc., 259
N.L.R.B. 512, 520 (1981) (involving a letter to employees that stated, "Don't be misled by
empty union promises. The union cannot guarantee you a single thing."); Douglas Div., The
Scott & Fetzer Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 1016, 1019-20 (1977) (involving a letter that told
employees to be wary of "any empty promises that might come from the union"); Bostitch
Div. of Textron, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 377, 382 (1969) (involving a letter to employees that
said, "[T]he union has made 'pie-in-the-sky" promises. Their promises are empty ones,
since they have no ability to carry them out.").
170. See, e.g., Palagonia Bakery Co., Inc., 2001 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 906, at *17 (Nov. 2,
2001) (involving employer who told employees at pre-election meeting "that the union will
not do anything 'serious' for the employees"); State Materials, Inc., 328 N.L.R.B. 1317,
1320 (1999) (involving a management official who told employees that the union is "not
going to do anything for you"); Atlantic Forest Prods., Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 855, 871 (1987)
(involving a manager who told employees that, "[wihat you'll be voting on is not whether
you like the sound of fancy union talk but whether you are willing to risk your steady job
and paycheck and the welfare of your family and this community on empty promises").
171. See, e.g., Menlo Food Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 337, 341 (1999) (involving a letter to
employees one week before election that stated, "A lot has been said by the union about
what they can do for you. They have made a lot of promises, but can they deliver ...? A
sound and profitable business will provide job security. Not empty promises as the union
has been telling you ... if [the union] want[s] to charge you monthly dues, assessments and
fines, they should give you a guarantee as to what you will receive in return for your
money."); Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 324 N.L.R.B. 72, 80 (1999) (involving a
memorandum to all employees that said, "You do not need a Union, which won't do
anything for you and which will cost you a lot of money.").
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employees, the employer can deride those explanations as "empty
promises," and the law prevents the union from correcting that inaccurate
message by giving the employees any real benefits or services during the
campaign.
Like a union, an employer is prohibited from granting benefits during
the election campaign, but an employer has more opportunities than any
union to provide employees benefits prior to the election campaign. The
reasons are obvious: the employer always has a relationship with its
employees before the union can even begin to contact them, and the
employer is in a position to give its employees desired benefits nearly
every day. Many employers rely heavily on these opportunities to resist
unionization.
Employers often change wages, benefits or other
employment terms with the primary motivation of influencing employees
to choose not to unionize.172
During union elections campaigns, all employers remind employees of
any benefits they have provided them, but many employers also use
benefit-related themes that depend on the union's inability to provide
benefits during the campaign. For example, a number of employers that
use the "empty promises" attack strengthen it by contrasting the union's
failure to do anything concrete with the employer's record of providing
tangible employment benefits. 73
An even more popular theme,
recommended by management consultants, is for employers to invoke
present or past benefits while making appeals to employees' loyalty or
gratitude. 174 Given that employers are freely allowed to make those sorts of
appeals, the notion that union benefits must be barred to prevent any "sense
of obligation" in employees can fairly be called risible.
Employers can and do take advantage of the prohibition on union
172. See, e.g., William A. Whiteside & Marvin L. Weinberg, Coping with the
Unionization Drive: A Guidefor the Careful Employer, PRAC. LAW., Dec. 1997, at 45.
173. See, e.g., The Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 256 N.L.R.B. 1135, 1141 (1981)

(involving a flyer distributed to employees that told them not to "trade proven company
performance for empty promises"); CHARLES L. HUGHES, MAKING UNIONS UNNECESSARY
16 (1976) (recommending to employers that when holdings meetings with employees during
the representation campaign, they ask employees to respond with a show of hands to
questions like: "Did the union get you your job?" "Can a union keep your job?" "Has a
union gotten you the pay increases that you've had in the past?").
174. See, e.g., MARTIN JAY LEVITT & TERRY CONROW, CONFESSIONS OF A UNION BUSTER

96 (relating story of employer who cynically told employees, "We're family"); JOHN J.
LAWLER, UNIONIZATION AND DEUNIONIZATION 149 tbl.7.3 (1990)(showing employer use of
"procompany" themes in campaigns, including "[m]anagement is a friend to workers" and
"[wlorkers already enjoy high wages and/or good working conditions"); ALFRED T.
DEMARIA,

How

MANAGEMENT

WINS

UNION

ORGANIZING

CAMPAIGNS

106

(1980)

(recommending that employer's communications to employees include an explanation of
existing benefits, "from the most important down to ... company picnics, bowling leagues,
and Christmas parties"); Diner's Drive-In, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 971, 973 (1986) (involving
letter that pleaded with employees to "stick by your Company and vote 'No').
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benefits to convey a misleading message to employees that unions can do
nothing tangible for them and can only make promises that will be
unrealized. Unions should be permitted to correct (or forestall) this wrong
impression by making real benefits available to employees during the
campaign. Union grants of benefits would also promote more balanced
elections by providing some counterweight to employer invocations of the
employer-provided benefits that employees have enjoyed over the years.
The prohibition on union grants of benefits is all the more peculiar
when compared with the law on union promises of benefits. In making
promises to voting workers, unions are not limited to promising benefits
that may be obtained through bargaining,7 5 but can also promise extra17
176
workplace benefits such as free legal services, generous strike benefits 7 ,
post-retirement medical services, and other benefits "irrespective of the
results of bargaining.' ' 78 As demonstrated by this list, unions are free to
179
promise benefits that are condemned in grant-of-benefits cases.
The law does place a limit on union promises of benefits, but the
restriction is far more reasonable and realistic than in grants of benefits
cases. In their decisions on promises of benefits, unlike those on grants of
benefits, the Board and courts have recognized the fact that unions provide
assistance to employees both inside and outside the workplace.
Accordingly, unions are permitted to promise "the extension of existing
membership benefits to employees."'8 ° In other words, when a union has a
practice of providing a form of assistance to its members, the union can
promise the same type of assistance to employee-voters during an election
campaign. A union cannot promise benefits that are "newly created,"'' on
an ad hoc basis, only for a given election and made contingent on the
union's ability to win the election. Under this rule, it's been found
objectionable for a union to promise employees that, if the union wins, it

175. See, e.g., DLC Corp., 333 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 166 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1367 (2001);
Station Operators, Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 263 n. I (1992).
176. See, e.g., Colquest Energy v. NLRB, 965 F.2d 116, 121 (6th Cir. 1992); Hallandale
Rehabilitation and Convalescent Center, 313 N.L.R.B. 835, 836 n.6 (1994); Dart Container,
277 N.L.R.B. 1369, 1369 n.7 (1985).
177. See, e.g., Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 661, 662 (1957).
178. See, e.g., Sports Shinko Corp., 316 N.L.R.B. 655, 667-68 (1999).
179. Compare Dart Container, 277 N.L.R.B. at 1369 n.7 (allowing promise of free legal
services) with Freund Bakery Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 928, 932-35 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (barring
union grant of free legal services); compare Sports Shinko, 316 N.L.R.B. at 667 (allowing
promise of medical benefits) with Wagner Electric Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 532, 533 (1967)
(barring union grant of life insurance benefits).
180. Trencor, Inc. v. NLRB, 110 F.3d 268, 273-74 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Sports
Shinko, 316 N.L.R.B. at 668; Mailing Serv., 293 N.L.R.B. at 565; Dart Container, 277
N.L.R.B. 1369, 1370.
181. Dart Container,277 N.L.R.B at 1370.
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will hold a raffle for $100,82 or "the biggest party in the history of
Texas.' 83 Thus, the law says it's acceptable for unions to promise regular
benefits (e.g. legal services, insurance benefits) that are typically provided
to members, but not other benefits (e.g. massive parties, money raffles,
cash payments) that most unions do not generally give to members. This
demarcation is based upon the realities of union-employee relationships. 184
Nearly the same line is drawn for grants of benefits by employers
during election campaigns. When an employer is charged with
objectionable conduct or an unfair labor practice for providing benefits, the
employer can raise as a defense that it has a past pattern or practice of
granting this benefit at regular intervals or at roughly the same time every
year.185 If the equivalent rule were applied to the union side of the
campaign, unions should be able to provide to employee-voters any
186
benefits the union has a "pattern or practice" of giving to their members.
Indeed, management lawyers Charles C. Jackson and Jeffrey S. Heller, in
their important article on employer promises and grants of benefits,
"presum[ed] the same defenses would be available to the union as to the
employer, i.e. that benefits conferred were part of the union's pattern of
organizing .... ,,187 In fact, however, unions are not afforded the "pattern
or practice" defense: as discussed earlier, the Board and courts have held
that unions during election campaigns are barred from providing even those
benefits that they normally provide to their members. 18 As a review of the
law on promises of benefits and employer grants of benefits makes clear,
the prohibition on union benefit grants is not only unrealistic and illogical,
but also an aberration when compared with rules on similar conduct.
The rule for union grants of benefits should be the same as the rule
governing union promises of benefits, and logically equivalent to the rule

182. Crestwood Manor, 234 N.L.R.B 1097 (1978).
183. Trencor, 110 F.3d at 270.
184. Professor Catherine L. Fisk has also advocated that in election campaigns the kinds
of benefits that unions ordinarily provide should be permitted, while cash payments should
not. Professor Fisk compares this distinction to the one that exists in general political
campaigns: "It would be impermissible for legislators to buy votes for cash, but certainly it
is not wrong for the legislators to offer assistance with government agencies or other forms
of constituent service (as long as the legislator of course does not abuse her power in doing
so)." See Fisk, supra note 4, at 91.
185. Jackson & Heller, supra note 10, at 18 & nn.78-82, and cases cited therein.
186. Unlike employers, unions in election campaigns do not typically have a
longstanding relationship with the employees in the election unit, so a union would never
have a "pattern" of providing benefits to employees in that unit. Consequently, the parallel
union "pattern" would have to be the union's practice of providing the benefit to employees
with whom the union does have an established relationship, i.e., employees who are
members of or represented by the union.
187. Jackson and Heller, supra note 10, at 24 n.106.
188. See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
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on employer grants of benefits. A union should be permitted to provide
employees any "existing incidents of membership," that is, benefits or
services that the union has a practice of providing to its "members."
"Members" for this purpose should not be taken literally. Under the
National Labor Relations Act, "membership" at most means that the
employee has fulfilled any obligations to pay dues, and unions cannot
impose any other conditions for membership, such as formally enrolling in
the union or attending union meetings. 8 9 Accordingly, if a union wishes to
extend "existing incidents of membership" to employees it is organizing,
the law should not require these employees to expressly join or enlist in the
union in some way. The employees also should not be required to pay dues
in order to become entitled to the benefit, because the law allows unions to
waive fees and dues until after an election or even negotiation of a first
contract. 190 Thus, when unions provide employees with benefits that are
"existing incidents of union membership," unions can and should provide
those benefits unconditionally, without requiring recipients to also become
union members.
This approach to union grants of benefits is not wholly without
precedent. In 1991, the Board, in NTA Graphics,correctly held that unions
should not be found to have "interfered with an election merely by
providing to its new members, even during the critical period, benefits to
which they would normally be entitled by virtue of their union
membership."' 9' Even more interestingly, in the first case in which the
Board found a union's unconditional grant of benefit to be objectionable,
the Regional Director's decision reviewed by the Board actually analyzed
the issue correctly. The Regional Director reasoned that the life insurance
policy offered by the union "was merely an incident of membership and
[the union] would be remiss if it did not extend to new applicants the
benefits to which all members were entitled."' 192 The Regional Director
then explained that "the sole difference between the affected employees
here and other members of [the union] is that for a limited period of time
they were not obligated to pay union dues and initiation fees, an
inducement held to be harmless" under the Board's waiver of dues
94
in Savair.1
policy,' 93 which has since been endorsed by the Supreme Court
The Regional Director discerned that when a union provides extraworkplace benefits to unorganized employees, the union is treating them as
it does its other members, except that (as the law permits) it is not requiring

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734, 735 (1963).
See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
NTA Graphics, 303 N.L.R.B. 803, 804 (1991).
Wagner Electric, 167 N.L.R.B. at 533.
Id.
Savair, 414 U.S. at 273 n.4.
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them to pay dues.
Unfortunately, the Board in Wagner Electric failed to grasp the
Regional Director's insight, apparently distracted by its perception that the
union's "gift" of life insurance was "most unusual."'1 95 The Board in
Wagner Electric chose the wrong course, and the courts followed suit at the
expense of employees over the years. Tens of thousands of employees (or
more) not only missed out on receiving union benefits and services, but
they were also deprived of making a fully informed election choice based
on everything the union could do to change their lives. In order to truly
protect employee freedom of choice, the Board must change the law to
allow unions to provide unrepresented employees the kinds of assistance
that the union has a practice of providing to its members.
IV. "GOOSE

AND

GANDER?": THE REASONABLENESS OF REMOVING THE

BAN ON UNION GRANTS OF BENEFITS WHILE THE BAN ON
EMPLOYERS REMAINS

The Board and courts have often referred to the ban on union grants of
benefits as being equivalent to the rule prohibiting employer grants of
benefits during election campaigns. In the seminal Wagner Electric
decision, the Board opined that "[ilt is our view that the gift of life
insurance coverage to the prospective voter is more akin to an employer's
grant of a wage increase in anticipation of a representation election than it
is to a waiver of union initiation fees and that it subjects the donees to a
constraint to vote for the donor union."' 196 More than twenty years later, the
Board in Mailing Services paraphrased Wagner in declaring that "a Union's
actual grant of benefits to potential members during the critical period is
'akin to an employer's grant of a wage increase in anticipation of a
representation election ...[which] subjects the donees to a constraint to
vote for the donor union."" 97 The Sixth Circuit in turn asserted in Comcast
Cablevision that "[i]n Mailing Services, the Board equated a union's grant
of free medical screening during the critical period with an employergranted wage increase."' 9 Summing up these comparisons, Board Member
Cohen in dissent in 52d Street Hotel Associates declared, "The Board has
long equated union grants of benefits during the critical period with
employer grants of a wage increase during that period, and found them
objectionable. [Citing Wagner Electric, Mailing Services]. In short,
according to precedent, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the
195. Wagner Electric, 167 N.L.R.B. at 533.

196. Id.
197. Mailing Servs., 293 N.L.R.B. 565, 565 (1989)(ellipsis in original)(quoting Wagner
Electric, 167 N.L.R.B. at 533).
198. Comcast Cablevision, 232 F.3d at 496.
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gander. ' 99
In a sense, the Board and courts know better. The reasons for
prohibiting employer grants of benefits are very different than the reasons
for prohibiting grants by unions.
The central basis for barring
unconditional benefits by employers is that they are an implied threat to
employees. As the Supreme Court famously said in Exchange Parts,
employer benefits are a "fist inside the velvet glove" and "[e]mployees are
not likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now conferred is
also the source from which future benefits must flow and which may dry up
if it is not obliged. 2 °°
By contrast, unions simply are not in a position to use unconditional
benefits to threaten employees in the way that employers have been found
to do. As Justice White observed in his dissent in Savair, "in the union
context, the fist is missing.., since [a union] was not the representative of
the employees, and would not be if it were unsuccessful in the election, [it]
could not make the same threat by offering a benefit which it would take
away if it lost the election. ' 20 1 In Savair, the Supreme Court majority
found that a union could threaten employees with conditional benefits (i.e.
benefit provided in return for employee signing a card), but neither the
Board nor any court have ever held that a union's providing an
unconditional benefit was threateningto employees. On the contrary, the
Board established in Primco Casting °2 that the "implied threat" rationale
does not apply to union grants of benefits.
The Board expressly
distinguished Exchange Parts on the ground that "[t]his coercive element,
the presence of an implied threat of future reprisal cannot properly be
found to be present where a union takes action such as the [union] took
here to improve its agency relationship with employees ...For, as the
employees are aware, if the union is not obliged - that is, if it loses the
election, it can have no effect on the employees in the future
whatsoever. ' ' In sum, the Board and courts have already realized that the
prohibitions on grants of benefits for employers and unions are not truly
equivalent.
One significant way in which the prohibitions differ is in the Board's
authority to revise them. As explained earlier, the Supreme Court has
never ruled that unconditional union grants of benefits are illegal or
objectionable. 2 4 By contrast, the Court in Exchange Parts did hold that
199. 52nd St. Hotel Assocs., 321 N.L.R.B. at 642 (Cohen, Member, dissenting).
200. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964).
201. Savair, 414 U.S. at 285 (White, J., dissenting).
202. Primco Casting Corp., 174 N.L.R.B. 244, 244 (1969).
203. Id. at 245.
204. See supra note II and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court's
only decision on union benefit grants, Savair, concerned conditional benefits that were
provided only to employees who signed a union authorization card).
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employer promises and grants of benefits during representation campaigns
were unfair labor practices and sufficient grounds for overturning the
election. °5 The Court's rulings on these issues are, of course, binding on
the Board and lower courts. Indeed, the Supreme Court has commanded
the Board and lower courts to adhere to its labor law precedents. 206 Hence,
the rule against employer promises and grants of benefits will stand unless
changed by the Supreme Court or Congress.
Given that the prohibition on employer grants of benefits will remain
in effect, can it be reasonable for the Board to lift the same ban on unions?
After all, many of the criticisms of the rule against union grants of benefits,
especially the criticisms discussed in Part II. B., 2007 also logically apply to
employer grants of benefits during election campaigns. If the Board, as
advocated in this article, explores repealing the prohibition on union grants
of benefits, the Board will probably have to consider whether it is
reasonable to remove that bar while the restriction on employer benefit
grants remains in place.
The disparity in treatment between employers and unions would
certainly not be unprecedented. On the contrary, it is common for rules
governing organizing campaigns to permit unions to engage in conduct that
is forbidden for employers. For example, in 1999 the Board reaffirmed its
position that employers are barred from photographing or videotaping
employees engaged in organizing activities, even though unions are
permitted to do both. 201
Similarly, while employers generally are
prohibited during organizing campaigns from polling or even asking their
employees if they support the union, unions are allowed to make such
inquiries and even to measure their support among the workforce. 20

9

Most

relevantly to the grants of benefits issue, unions are permitted to promise
employees benefits during organizing
• 210 campaigns, while employers are
forbidden from making such promises..
The Board in Randell Warehouse
explained the basic reason underlying all these situations where the law
205. See Exchange Parts, 375 U.S. at 405.
206. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1992). See also Susan K. Goplen,
Note, Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies' Legal Interpretationsafter Lechmere,
68 Wash. L. Rev. 207 (1993)(explaining that Supreme Court made clear in Lechmere that
the Board and lower courts were required to obey Supreme Court precedents when
interpreting the NLRA).
207. See supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text (e.g. evidence that grants of benefits
do not affect most voters' motivations).
208. Randell Warehouse of Arizona, Inc., 328 N.L.R.B. 1034, 1034 (1999).
209. See, e.g., Kusan Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 749 F.2d 362, 365 (6th Cir. 1984), in which the
court upheld the Board's policy of treating union polling more favorably than employer
polling. Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit rejected the employer's contention that "what is
sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander." See id. at 364-65.
210. See Hardin, supra note 2, at 115-18 (promises of benefits by employers prohibited)
and 366 (promises of benefits by unions generally permitted).
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proscribes employer conduct but permits the same type of conduct by
unions: "The Board and the courts ... have long applied differing
standards to certain types of employer and union conduct during election
campaigns in recognition of the fundamental fact that an employer, unlike a
union, has virtually
absolute control over employees' terms and conditions
' 2
of employment. 11
The fundamental fact that the employer controls the workplace also
underlies some possible justifications for continuing the ban on employer
grants of benefits even if the prohibition for unions is repealed. One such
justification, already discussed, is that employer grants of benefits can be
threatening to employees in ways that union benefit grants are not. 212 This
is not because unions are more benevolent than employers, but because a
union that loses a representation election stands in a much different relation
to employees than an employer that "loses" an election by having its
employees vote in a union. When a union loses an election, it has no
presence in the workplace. The employer need not and in fact cannot deal
with the union, 213 the employer can and probably will exclude the union
from its property, 14 and the union cannot even try again in another election
for at least one year.215 The union could take away "extra-workplace"
benefits that it provided to the employees, though there may well be
contractual or other legal limits on doing so,2 16 but there is no way that the
union could make employees worse off than they were before the union
was elected. By contrast, an employer will continue to exert primary
control over a workplace even after a union wins an election, and an
employer can use that control to make employees worse off in innumerable
ways.
The Supreme Court in Exchange Parts, in addition to holding that
employers could use benefit grants to threaten employees, also found that

211. Randell Warehouse, 328 NLRB at 1037.
212. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
213. See Hardin, supra note 2, at 323-34 (explaining that when a union is not supported
by a majority of employees, it is illegal for the employer to bargain with that union or in any
way treat it as the employees' representative).
214. See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After
Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REv. 305 (1994)(discussing employers' exercise of their right to
exclude union representatives from their property).
215. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1994) ("[n]o election shall be directed in any bargaining
unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election
shall have been held.").
216. For example, as explained previously, when union lawyers are pursuing lawsuits on
behalf of employees, it would be a breach of ethics for them to withdraw representation
when the union loses an election. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. Also, when a
union enrolls employees in insurance plans, training programs, or other benefit programs,
the employees may become parties to a contract, and thus entitled to continued receipt of
these benefits.
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employers could use them to trick employees. 217 The Court explained that
its ruling would not discourage true improvements for employees because
"[t]he beneficence of an employer is likely to be ephemeral if prompted by
a threat of unionization which is subsequently removed. Insulating the
right of collective organization from calculated good will of this sort
deprives employees of little that has lasting value. 21 s In other words, if
allowed, an employer could grant employees benefits during an election
campaign to induce employees to vote against the union, and then after the
union's loss the employer could remove those benefits or make up the cost
of those benefits through reductions elsewhere.
Although unions could also trick employees by granting them benefits
before an election and retracting them after the union wins the election,
unions have greater disincentives to do that than employers do. While
retaining the good will of its employees is no doubt valuable to an
employer, it is absolutely essential to a union. Under the law, a union
cannot be the representative of a unit of employees unless it is supported by
a majority of the employees in that unit.2 19 If a majority of employees
inform an employer they no longer want the union as a representative, the
employer can withdraw recognition of that union and cease dealing with it
2221
as a representative. 220
Currently, under the Board's certification bar rule z ,
unions are protected from withdrawal of recognition for the first year after
winning an election, but that could change. Congress has considered a bill
that would eliminate the certification bar,222 and the Board certainly has the
authority to modify or waive that bar in the case of unions that trick
employees by retracting benefits. Moreover, for any union that tricks
employees and loses their support as a result, the certification year will
217. See Exchange Parts, 375 U.S. at 409. Federal appeals courts and the Board have
recognized that this is an additional rationale the Supreme Court relied on in prohibiting
employer grants of benefits. See, e.g., Russell-Newman Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 247,
252 (5th Cir. 1969); Great Plains Steel Corp., 183 N.L.R.B. 968, 977 (1970). However, in
Skyline Distributors,concurring judge Karen LeCraft Henderson questioned the majority's
statement that the Supreme Court in Exchange Parts "had more than one 'premise' or made
more than one 'argument'," and she asserted that "[t]he Court's concern was with an
employer who grants employee benefits with the purpose of affecting the outcome of a
representation election." Skyline Distribs. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 403, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(Henderson, J., concurring)(citations omitted).
218. Exchange Parts, 375 U.S. at 410.

219. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). See also Int'l Ladies Garment Workers Union v. NLRB,
366 U.S. 731 (1961) (holding that it is illegal for an employer to recognize a union as the
representative of its employees before that union is supported by a majority of those
employees, and itis also illegal for such a "minority" union to accept such recognition).
220. See Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105 (2001).
221.

See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 (1954) (approving Board's establishment of

the certification bar rule). See also Sheridan Manor Nursing Home, Inc. v. NLRB, 225 F.3d
248, 250 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2000) (recent application of the certification bar rule).
222. See H.R. 694, 107th Cong. (2001).
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probably do it little good. In recent years, only about 25% of newly
certified unions have reached a collective bargaining agreement during the
certification year, 223 and the likelihood of success would surely be far lower
for a union that lost the support of employees by engaging in underhanded
tactics.224
Withdrawal of recognition and decertification are not the only ways
that employees could punish a union that retracts benefits. Unions, unlike
employers, are democratic organizations subject to control by their
employee-members.
The federal Labor-Management Reporting &
Disclosure Act (LMRDA) requires that national and local union officers be
elected by secret ballots cast by union members, 225 and also requires that

increases in union dues and fees be approved by a secret vote.

226

The
227

LMRDA also requires every union to adopt a constitution and bylaws.
These constitutions, in turn, typically require membership voting and
approval of various forms of union business. 228 Consequently, if local or

223. See Pam Ginsbach, One-Quarterof Newly Certified Unions Reached Contracts in
FY 1998, Agency Finds, 79 DALY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-2 (April 26, 1999)(discussing that
"[flor the third consecutive year," about one-fourth of newly certified unions obtained a
contract in the first year).
224. In Skyline Distributors, the D.C. Circuit opined that employers also had an
incentive to avoid retracting benefits because "[their] employees are not foreclosed from
restarting a union campaign and insisting on a representation election if the employer later
limits or withdraws benefits." 99 F.3d at 408 n.l (citing Bok, supra note 50, at 114-15).
However, there are serious obstacles to "restarting" a successful union campaign. As noted
earlier, a union that has lost a representation election must wait at least one year before a
second election can be held. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3)(1994). This means that a union will
have to carry out an organizing campaign that sustains employee interest in the union for at
least one year. For unions, even short organizing campaigns usually demand a tremendous
investment in financial and other resources. See, e.g., Goin' South: To Save Itself
Organized Labor Must Capture Dixie, 6 THE BLACK COMMENTATOR (June 27, 2002), at
http://www.blackcommentator.com/going-south.html ("Union organizing is expensive,
costing thousands of dollars per person."); Barbara Solow, Prescription: Union, THE
INDEPENDENT WEEKLY (Sept. 13, 2000), at http://indyweek.com/durham/2000-09-13/
cover.html ("We went to a board meeting recently and we were told you can count on
spending $1,000 per member to organize a unit .... We just don't have that kind of
money."); News for Analysts in Transit (June 1997), at http:www.osaunion.org/campaigns/
jun97 ("Organizing is expensive, stressful, a lot of hard work and not at all guaranteed of
success. Most organizing drives fail."). Moreover, unions' rank-and-file members are often
resistant to devoting resources to organizing, and such resistance would likely be especially
acute when organizing is aimed at a workplace where the union failed before. See Bill
Fletcher, Jr. and Richard W. Hurd, Overcoming Obstacles to Transformation, in Rekindling
the Movement, supra note 137, at 194-95 (discussing "members" as obstacles to
organizing).
225. 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1994).
226. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3) (1994).
227. 29 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1994).
228. See generally Roger C. Hartley, The Framework of Democracy in Union
Government, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 13 (1982).
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even national union officers were to retract benefits they had provided
employees during an organizing campaign, employees have many
opportunities to retaliate against the union by challenging the union's
officers in elections and voting against the union's preferences at union
meetings.
By contrast, American employers are controlled by owners and
shareholders, not by their employees. Employees have no opportunity to
"vote out" management officials or to vote against management policies.
Employees could complain, but the employer is under no obligation to
listen to their complaints. Employees could "vote with their feet" by
quitting, but this entails giving up all of the benefits of their jobs and
risking protracted unemployment. In sum, unions are less likely than
employers to retract benefits provided during representation campaigns, not
because unions are morally superior, but because of the practical reality
that employees can more easily and effectively penalize unions for such
trickery.
There are many other practical considerations that support retaining
the prohibition on employer grants of benefits, even if that prohibition is
lifted for unions. Employees inevitably know much more about the
employer and the benefits provided than they know about the union.
Indeed, it has long been recognized that "employees considering
unionization seldom possess much direct knowledge concerning the union,
its activities, and its potential to bring about better wages and working
conditions, while in contrast employees are well aware of the employer's
control of wages and working conditions."2 9 This relates to the point made
in Part III, that allowing union grants of benefits is necessary to counter the
benefits the employer has provided to employees and which the employer
is free to remind them of throughout the representation campaign.230 In this
way, repealing the ban on union benefits would help to equalize the playing
field. Removing the prohibition for employers would put employers in a
position to wipe out this "equalization" effect.
Inequality between employers and unions in opportunities to benefit
employees is another possible justification for preserving the ban on
employer benefits during representation campaigns.
An employer's
relationship with its employees almost always predates that of the union, in
many cases by years. The employer, through all this time, has had the
chance to grant employees the benefits they may desire. By contrast, the
union, virtually by definition, has had no ability to provide benefits until it
makes contact with the employees. Such contact often is counted as the
beginning of the organizing campaign, or at least close enough to affect

229. 52nd St. Hotel Assocs., 321 N.L.R.B. at 630 (citing Bok, supra note 50, at 49-55).

230. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
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Given this enormous head start that employers have over unions in
terms of providing benefits, it is not unreasonable to say that employers
cannot continue to grant new benefits during the representation campaign,
even if unions can.
Another key distinction between unions and employers, which may
justify treating their provision of benefits differently, is the point made at
the outset of this article. Unions exist to assist employees. That is the
reason they are formed, maintained, and operated. Employers are not
formed and operated in order to benefit their employees. Instead, they are
in business to make widgets or (in our increasingly service-oriented
economy) to provide widgeting services. Hence, it could be argued that it
is only natural that unions should be in a preferred position over employers
in providing benefits to employees, because that is the central function of
unions.
The NLRB itself provides some support for this argument. Employees
who are already members of a union have a Section 7 right to assist other
unorganized employees.232 Through their political control of the union, and
their financial support of it, it is really the union members who are granting
benefits to unorganized employees, and the members are exercising their
Section 7 rights in doing so. 233 Moreover, the unorganized employees have
a Section 7 right to receive assistance from a union. Both the Board and
courts have recognized that "[t]he giving of aid by a labor union to an
employee.., is clearly a concerted activity on the part of employees
protected by the Act., 234 By contrast, the NLRA does not establish a
positive "right" for employers to give employees assistance or benefits that
they desire. Thus, Section 7 of the NLRA provides a strong basis for
permitting unions to grant benefits to unorganized employees, while there
is no corresponding statutory basis for allowing employers to do the same.
it.

231. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing cases that demonstrate that
the prohibition on union grants of benefits is not truly limited to the "critical period"
between the filing of an election petition and the holding of the election).
232. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (stating that "employees shall have the right to... engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection").
233. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 564 (1978)(establishing that under Section
7 employees have the right, through their union, to assist other employers' employees); see
also Brief for Intervenor AFL-CIO at 17, Freund Baking Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 928 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (No. 97-1694)(tying this principle to union grants of benefits in organizing
campaigns).
234. See 52nd St. Hotel Assocs., 321 NLRB at 634 (quoting Moss Planing Mill Co. v.
NLRB, 206 F.2d 557, 559 (4th Cir. 1953)). The omitted portion of the quote refers to aid in
the form of a "prosecution of a claim for back wages", but there is nothing unique about
such a lawsuit that makes it more protected by Section 7 than many other forms of
assistance that unions regularly provide to their members, and this article contends they
should be allowed to extend to unorganized employees.
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LET UNIONS BE UNIONS

CONCLUSION

The existing rule against unions granting benefits to employees during
representation campaigns should be drastically revised. A union should be
permitted to provide employees any type of benefits that it has a practice of
providing to members or non-member employees whom it represents. For
many unions, such benefits would include legal assistance, insurance,
educational services, and an array of other benefits that aid employees.
The current rule barring union-provided benefits is premised on the
misconception that a union's exclusive role with regard to employees is to
represent them in bargaining and in dealings with the employer. As
important as that role is, unions have always had much more to offer
employees. The current rule prevents many employees from learning about
union "extra-workplace" benefits, or from ascertaining the truth about
employer charges that union descriptions of such benefits are merely
"empty promises." In this way, the Board has imposed on employees a
narrow and inaccurate understanding of what unions do and how a union
can affect their lives. By allowing unions to perform their core function of
assisting employees, by simply letting unions be unions, the Board would
greatly enhance the ability of employees to make fully informed decisions
about how they can exercise their statutory rights in choosing whether to
form or join a union, or to refrain from doing so.

